0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.
Don, you're rambling again; get a grip.
Quote from: alancalverd on 02/12/2013 16:43:50Quoteanyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.I'd love to. But first, tell me what it is. I don't buy goods without a meaningful description.simply because there is no clear definition of it ?Consciousness, is , per definition, so elusive deceptive and mysterious that it still does escape any unanymous clear definition ,but that does not prevent scientists , philosophers ...from trying to approach it ,their own ways .
Quoteanyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.I'd love to. But first, tell me what it is. I don't buy goods without a meaningful description.
anyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.
Quote from: DonQuichotte on 02/12/2013 16:52:43Quote from: alancalverd on 02/12/2013 16:43:50Quoteanyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.I'd love to. But first, tell me what it is. I don't buy goods without a meaningful description.simply because there is no clear definition of it ?Consciousness, is , per definition, so elusive deceptive and mysterious that it still does escape any unanymous clear definition ,but that does not prevent scientists , philosophers ...from trying to approach it ,their own ways .Taking that fact into account, maybe you should take this Philosophical question to a Philosophy forum? It does not meet the qualifications to be addressed as a New Theory. This is precisely the reason you're receiving so much grief here Don...... Evidently, the intelligence required to recognize that fact is sorely lacking.
Poor Chalmers can also not realise the fact that no naturalist theory of consciousness, either the reductive or the non-reductive one , can account for consciousness , the poor lad .He's just moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm
Quote from: DonQuichotte on 02/12/2013 17:06:32Poor Chalmers can also not realise the fact that no naturalist theory of consciousness, either the reductive or the non-reductive one , can account for consciousness , the poor lad .He's just moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realmHow are you not doing the same? How are you not simply moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm by invoking the immaterial?
Why don't you just try to address my above displayed posts to you , seriously ?
Quote from: DonQuichotte on 02/12/2013 17:38:31Why don't you just try to address my above displayed posts to you , seriously ? I might if I could find something coherent in them to address...
Quote from: cheryl j on 02/12/2013 19:53:30Quote from: DonQuichotte on 02/12/2013 17:06:32Poor Chalmers can also not realise the fact that no naturalist theory of consciousness, either the reductive or the non-reductive one , can account for consciousness , the poor lad .He's just moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realmHow are you not doing the same? How are you not simply moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm by invoking the immaterial?Good question indeed , for a change : i must give you credit for just that ,sweet Cheryl of ours : good thinking,no kidding,i am serious : Well,since the materialist "all is matter , including the mind " conception of nature is false ,mainly because materialism cannot account for consciousness , then , logically , not -all is matter ,including consciousness thus = consciousness is not material physical or biological = simple logic .
I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible, and I even argue for a form of dualism. But this is just part of the scientific process. Certain sorts of explanation turn out not to work, so we need to embrace other sorts of explanation instead. Everything I say here is compatible with the results of contemporary science; our picture of the natural world is broadened, not overturned. And this broadening allows the possibility of a naturalistic theory of consciousness that might have been impossible without it. It seems to me that to ignore the problems of consciousness would be antiscientific; it is in the scientific spirit to face up to them directly. To those whosuspect that science requires materialism, I ask that you wait and see.I should note that the conclusions of this work are conclusions, in the strongest sense. Temperamentally, I amstrongly inclined toward materialist reductive explanation, and I have no strong spiritual or religious inclinations.For a number of years, I hoped for a materialist theory; when I gave up on this hope, it was quite reluctantly. It eventually seemed plain to me that these conclusions were forced on anyone who wants to take consciousness seriously. Materialism is a beautiful and compelling view of the world, but to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides.Source : "The conscious mind " by David J.Chalmers , Introduction .
Nor does immaterialism account for consciousness. In addition, it has not explained any phenomena. Thus consciousness is not immaterial. Simple logic.
I must confess I hate logical arguments based simply on the conceivability of something, because the devil is always in the details. Just because something is not logically contradictory (like an married bachelor) and is conceivable (like a flying toaster, inverted qualia) does not mean it is not contradictory or impossible on some other level (like water that freezes at 200 degrees)
Someone like David Cooper might argue that philosophical zombies are not just conceivable but probable, in the future with AI. Dennett says they already exist, and we’re it. Or maybe he just says that once in a while to piss off philosophers. I think his actual view of consciousness is better reflected in his statement “The time has come to put the burden of proof squarely on those who persist in using the term,” that is, he’s not going to worry about it until somebody comes up with a definition of consciousness that isn’t hopelessly confused.
Ramachandron might actually pose a bigger threat to the philosophical zombie argument than Dennett. Ramachandran’s research suggests that a philosophical zombie would not be like us in every way except for the absence of conscious experience... In other words, there may be no such thing as a zombie who could be like us in every other respect besides consciousness. One can't say Ramachandron's findings conclusively prove this, but if it were the case, it would put Chalmers in a bad position.
what constructive contribution has philosophy made to our lives?
there are properties of objects which cannot (in principle) be explained in physical terms
Don Quixote: The chivalrous but UNREALISTIC hero from the novel by Cervantes. Very serious similarities here by name and personality Mr. Don.