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Nurture and circumstance.
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=9D_wzEq2p18Moral Realism and Moral ErrorQuoteThis video outlines a new argument from moral disagreement, which challenges moral realists to provide a theory of error: an explanation of why so many people have been so mistaken about the moral facts. This is based on Nicolas Smyth's article "Moral Knowledge and the Genealogy of Error"0:00 - Introduction0:39 - The reliability challenge9:43 - Denying disagreement16:01 - Non-moral error28:08 - Distorting factors34:36 - Consistency reasoning40:57 - IntuitionismTo get the acceptance from moral philosophers, the universal moral standard also needs to take the reliability challenge. Why so many people have been so mistaken about the moral facts?
This video outlines a new argument from moral disagreement, which challenges moral realists to provide a theory of error: an explanation of why so many people have been so mistaken about the moral facts. This is based on Nicolas Smyth's article "Moral Knowledge and the Genealogy of Error"0:00 - Introduction0:39 - The reliability challenge9:43 - Denying disagreement16:01 - Non-moral error28:08 - Distorting factors34:36 - Consistency reasoning40:57 - Intuitionism
Let's start with moral realism. The name suggests that morality must be based on something that is real, instead of imaginary.
How's predation, parasitism, cannibalism, sexism, nepotism, tribalism, racism, nationalism, humanism, patriotism, altruism, socialism, communism, capitalism, slavery, genocide, homicide
"Natural" means whatever you want it to mean, but mostly means "not man-made".
However you might get more mileage by distinguishing "natural" as "real, physical or concrete" compared with "supernatural".
Morality (from Latin: moralitas, lit. 'manner, character, proper behavior') is the differentiation of intentions, decisions and actions between those that are distinguished as proper (right) and those that are improper (wrong).[1] Morality can be a body of standards or principles derived from a code of conduct from a particular philosophy, religion or culture, or it can derive from a standard that a person believes should be universal.[2] Morality may also be specifically synonymous with "goodness" or "rightness".Moral philosophy includes meta-ethics, which studies abstract issues such as moral ontology and moral epistemology, and normative ethics, which studies more concrete systems of moral decision-making such as deontological ethics and consequentialism. An example of normative ethical philosophy is the Golden Rule, which states: "One should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself."[3][4]Immorality is the active opposition to morality (i.e. opposition to that which is good or right), while amorality is variously defined as an unawareness of, indifference toward, or disbelief in any particular set of moral standards or principles.[5][6][7]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality#Descriptive_and_normativeIn its descriptive sense, "morality" refers to personal or cultural values, codes of conduct or social mores from a society that provides these codes of conduct in which it applies and is accepted by an individual. It does not connote objective claims of right or wrong, but only refers to that which is considered right or wrong. Descriptive ethics is the branch of philosophy which studies morality in this sense.[10]In its normative sense, "morality" refers to whatever (if anything) is actually right or wrong, which may be independent of the values or mores held by any particular peoples or cultures. Normative ethics is the branch of philosophy which studies morality in this sense.[10]
Descriptive ethics, also known as comparative ethics, is the study of people's beliefs about morality.[1] It contrasts with prescriptive or normative ethics, which is the study of ethical theories that prescribe how people ought to act, and with meta-ethics, which is the study of what ethical terms and theories actually refer to. The following examples of questions that might be considered in each field illustrate the differences between the fields:Descriptive ethics: What do people think is right?Meta-ethics: What does "right" even mean?Normative (prescriptive) ethics: How should people act?Applied ethics: How do we take moral knowledge and put it into practice?https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descriptive_ethics
There's one born every minute, which is why priests can make a living.
Having kids... in this economy?!Parents want the best for their children, even if they don't have the power to guarantee their happiness. Is it worth the risk to create new life as the world is burning around us? Let's find out in this Wisecrack Edition: Is Having Babies Ethical?
Is Having Babies Ethical?
morality must be based on something that is real
Quote from: hamdani yusuf on 26/01/2022 12:32:30Is Having Babies Ethical?In a word, no.
Quote from: hamdani yusuf on 22/01/2022 22:45:45morality must be based on something that is realAs they say in Parliament, I refer the honorable gentleman to the answer I gave several pages ago. 1. Would you like it if I did it to you?2.Would you do it to your own family members? How much more real can you get?
Genetic codes determine neural connections which interpret some combination of sensory inputs as pleasure or pain. They also determine instinctive behaviors.Some neural connections can act as memory. Combined with predictive function, they create emotional states like happiness and sorrow. Deformed or broken neural connections can be caused by genetic disorders, infection by virus or biological parasites, cancerous cells, or physical incidents. Some abnormalities in neural connections can cause impaired empathy, or the lack of capacity to place oneself in another's position. They render the golden rule useless as a formal moral system, because they deny the empathy, which is the basic foundation of the golden rule.
IMO, studying descriptive ethics is like reading a map. It tells us what we will find in the area that's mapped, but doesn't tell us what we should do or where our destination is, let alone how to get there.
A Taxonomy of Moral RealismM. Y. ChewWolfson Collegehttps://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TEth/TEthChew.htmABSTRACT: The realist dispute in ethics has wide implications for moral ontology, epistemology, and semantics. Common opinion holds that this debate goes to the heart of the phenomenology of moral values and affects the way in which we understand the nature of moral value, moral disagreement, and moral reflection. But it has not been clearly demonstrated what is involved in moral realist theory. I provide a framework which distinguishes three different versions of the theory while at the same time showing the interrelations between them. I also demonstrate how issues such as objectivity, cognitivism, and truth can be related into the discussion by means of this framework.
This framework can be diagrammatically represented in the following manner:Are ethical statements truth-evaluable?Yes -No-- Early Emotivism (Ayer)Does descriptivism offer a correct account of moral semantics?Yes-- Descriptivism No-- Non-descriptivismEmotivism (Stevenson)Prescriptivism (Hare)Quasi-Realism (Blackburn)Expressivism (Gibbard)Are any of these statements true?Yes-- Cognitivism No-- Non-cognitivismError Theory (Mackie)Do we know whether these are true?Yes-No-- ScepticismAre ethical statements to be given a literal interpretation?Yes-No-- Non-realist CognitivismRationalism (Kantian Constructivism)Relativism (Harman, Wong)Do moral properties supervene on natural properties?Yes-No-- Non-supervenient Moral RealismEthical Intuitionism (Moore)Are these reducible to natural properties?Yes-- Reductive supervenient Moral RealismConfirmation Theory (Railton, Boyd, Sturgeon) No-- Non-reductive supervenient Moral RealismBritish Moral Realism (McDowell, Platts)
Moral RealismFirst published Mon Oct 3, 2005; substantive revision Tue Feb 3, 2015Taken at face value, the claim that Nigel has a moral obligation to keep his promise, like the claim that Nyx is a black cat, purports to report a fact and is true if things are as the claim purports. Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way).As a result, those who reject moral realism are usefully divided into (i) those who think moral claims do not purport to report facts in light of which they are true or false (non-cognitivists) and (ii) those who think that moral claims do carry this purport but deny that any moral claims are actually true (error theorists).It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true. Moral realism is not a particular substantive moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. Still, much of the debate about moral realism revolves around either what it takes for claims to be true or false at all (with some arguing that moral claims do not have what it takes) or what it would take specifically for moral claims to be true (with some arguing that moral claims would require something the world does not provide).The debate between moral realists and anti-realists assumes, though, that there is a shared object of inquiry—in this case, a range of claims all involved are willing to recognize as moral claims—about which two questions can be raised and answered: Do these claims purport to report facts in light of which they are true or false? Are some of them true? Moral realists answer ‘yes’ to both, non-cognitivists answer ‘no’ to the first (and, by default, ‘no’ to the second) while error theorists answer ‘yes’ to the first and ‘no’ to the second. (With the introduction of “minimalism” about truth and facts, things become a bit more complicated. See the section on semantics, below.) To note that some other, non-moral, claims do not (or do) purport to report facts or that none (or some) of them are true, is to change the subject. That said, it is strikingly hard to nail down with any accuracy just which claims count as moral and so are at issue in the debate. For the most part, those concerned with whether moral realism is true are forced to work back and forth between an intuitive grasp of which claims are at issue and an articulate but controversial account of what they have in common such that realism either is, or is not, defensible about them.By all accounts, moral realism can fairly claim to have common sense and initial appearances on its side. That advantage, however, might be easily outweighed; there are a number of powerful arguments for holding that it is a mistake to think of moral claims as true.1. Moral Disagreement2. Metaphysics3. Psychology4. Epistemology5. Semantics...
By your moral standard, a nihilist or psychopath can do whatever he wants without breaking any moral rules.What family do you refer to? Is it limited to nuclear family? Is it applicable to extended family? tribal family, racial family, national family, global family?
the difficulties that moral philosophers are facing in order to reach a general agreement.