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Just Chat! / Is it morally acceptable for companion animals to eat a meat based diet?
« on: 29/12/2009 13:46:20 »
A little bit of ethics. More my field. I will try to show that intentions overrule results, then that veganism or even vegetarianism is ethically superior to at least facilities where animals are mistreated for production of meat or recourses, then draw a conclusion.
On a side-note, I eat meat. Love it.
First off, we should try to discern whether or not intentionality of an action is important. I mean to say that moral actions tend to have a certain for of intentions, otherwise they aren't called moral actions. For example, me walking downstairs to get me some food has nothing to do with the intentions of killing a murderer.
Very well, intentionality. Does it matter? If we were to kill a murderer, would we have to look at the intentions? Lets say we do not.
A man named X kills a murderer named Y. X has no idea that Y is a murderer, he is just a random man walking across the street alone at night. X happens to have a gun on him and shoots Y, who dies instantly.
Without looking at intentions, what do we make of this act? Y could've NOT been a murderer. In fact, there is a >99% chance Y wasn't a murderer. Yet the results were good (assuming Y was a bad man who murdered innocents for pleasure). Must we morally applaud X's actions? Or must we mathematically applaud his actions and lock X up right after, because he did not know? I think the second, I hope all can agree with me.
Lets not look at the same case where intentions DO matter. X shoots Y. X happens to know that Y is the murderer of his best friend's wife and children. X knows his friend wants Y dead, but he does not want to spend the rest of his life in jail because of his sick mother, who needs attention. X, angered by this injustice, shoots Y with the risk of jail time, to avenge his friend's loved ones.
Here we can clearly see that X's intentions were good. We would morally applaud his action unless we have a very strong disgust for murder, at which point we may say that his actions were at least understandable, more so than when we wouldn't have considered his intentions.
(X's intentions, of course, might have been bad, but that would simply make his act immoral to us.)
Now, lets look at the ethical aspects of eating meat. It is safe to say that eating factory meat, where animals are mistreated for the ends of production, might cause them pain. Should we care that they are in pain? Lets have a look.
Personally, I'm a Kantian, but it's always good to consider other ethical views as well. Peter Singer's version of Utilitarianism introduced the concept of Speciesism. He asked the question: on what do we base that a certain human has pain, be it mental or physical? We base this on his responses of fear or sadness, or his screams of pain, of course. Can we discern these responses in animals? Yes, we can. Kick a dog, he will retreat with what appears to be a feeling of sadness.
Utilitarianism, on the most fundamental level, says that the action that causes the most people the most happiness is the best action. Peter Singer puts the focus on the immoral implications, meaning that inflicting suffering and unhappiness is automatically immoral.
We can accept Utilitarianism as a decent ethical theory. Sure, it proves to have some problems, but it is considerably good at pointing out the more obvious chases at the least.
If a vegan or vegetarian has the intention of reducing suffering of creatures that might have (and are likely to have) a sense of pain, those intentions should be morally applauded. We have no absolute sense of what is ethically good and bad, but if we accept that Utilitarianism and Speciesism at least contain some sense, then the intentions of vegans and veganists are, in fact, morally good.
So yes, the best any scientist or philosopher can do is minimize the results of non-veganism or non-vegetarianism, attack Utilitarianism and Speciesism or just adopt an extreme sense of Hedonistic Utilitarianism which has no place for Speciesism, but let's hope it won't have to come that far.
Feel free to attack any of my points made.
Peter aka Ekkoe
On a side-note, I eat meat. Love it.
First off, we should try to discern whether or not intentionality of an action is important. I mean to say that moral actions tend to have a certain for of intentions, otherwise they aren't called moral actions. For example, me walking downstairs to get me some food has nothing to do with the intentions of killing a murderer.
Very well, intentionality. Does it matter? If we were to kill a murderer, would we have to look at the intentions? Lets say we do not.
A man named X kills a murderer named Y. X has no idea that Y is a murderer, he is just a random man walking across the street alone at night. X happens to have a gun on him and shoots Y, who dies instantly.
Without looking at intentions, what do we make of this act? Y could've NOT been a murderer. In fact, there is a >99% chance Y wasn't a murderer. Yet the results were good (assuming Y was a bad man who murdered innocents for pleasure). Must we morally applaud X's actions? Or must we mathematically applaud his actions and lock X up right after, because he did not know? I think the second, I hope all can agree with me.
Lets not look at the same case where intentions DO matter. X shoots Y. X happens to know that Y is the murderer of his best friend's wife and children. X knows his friend wants Y dead, but he does not want to spend the rest of his life in jail because of his sick mother, who needs attention. X, angered by this injustice, shoots Y with the risk of jail time, to avenge his friend's loved ones.
Here we can clearly see that X's intentions were good. We would morally applaud his action unless we have a very strong disgust for murder, at which point we may say that his actions were at least understandable, more so than when we wouldn't have considered his intentions.
(X's intentions, of course, might have been bad, but that would simply make his act immoral to us.)
Now, lets look at the ethical aspects of eating meat. It is safe to say that eating factory meat, where animals are mistreated for the ends of production, might cause them pain. Should we care that they are in pain? Lets have a look.
Personally, I'm a Kantian, but it's always good to consider other ethical views as well. Peter Singer's version of Utilitarianism introduced the concept of Speciesism. He asked the question: on what do we base that a certain human has pain, be it mental or physical? We base this on his responses of fear or sadness, or his screams of pain, of course. Can we discern these responses in animals? Yes, we can. Kick a dog, he will retreat with what appears to be a feeling of sadness.
Utilitarianism, on the most fundamental level, says that the action that causes the most people the most happiness is the best action. Peter Singer puts the focus on the immoral implications, meaning that inflicting suffering and unhappiness is automatically immoral.
We can accept Utilitarianism as a decent ethical theory. Sure, it proves to have some problems, but it is considerably good at pointing out the more obvious chases at the least.
If a vegan or vegetarian has the intention of reducing suffering of creatures that might have (and are likely to have) a sense of pain, those intentions should be morally applauded. We have no absolute sense of what is ethically good and bad, but if we accept that Utilitarianism and Speciesism at least contain some sense, then the intentions of vegans and veganists are, in fact, morally good.
So yes, the best any scientist or philosopher can do is minimize the results of non-veganism or non-vegetarianism, attack Utilitarianism and Speciesism or just adopt an extreme sense of Hedonistic Utilitarianism which has no place for Speciesism, but let's hope it won't have to come that far.
Feel free to attack any of my points made.
Peter aka Ekkoe