[dlorde]

...(Prior note :
This thread was just inspired by dlorde's relative explanations of the maths of chaos to me ,that's all .
So, i just wanted to hear his own opinion on the subject of free will ,since he said that free will can exist even within a deterministic universe .
Stuff like that .)

Uh-huh. Usually when people want my opinion on something they ask me. If they create a thread for the purpose, they let me know. Just sayin'.

But as you derailed your own thread to bang on about materialism in science, I wonder whether you're still interested.

If you are still interested, we need to define what we're talking about. I have yet to hear a coherent non-compatibilist definition for free will, so please give a clear and unambiguous definition or explanation of precisely what you mean by 'free will', and I'll give a detailed response.

[Ethos_]

I do agree that we need to consolidate this whole immaterial argument into one thread. Having it spread out over several different ones is just sloppy. Heck, I'm considering giving up on the whole thing because nobody is making any real progress in any direction despite the massive number of responses that we've thrown at each other.

And the reason for that dilemma revolves around the eminent fact that the subject matter in these threads is more about philosophy, and or faith, than it is about science. I suggest we offer a philosophy category at NSF and move these threads to that location.

[dlorde]

There are many intriguing scientific aspects to free will and consciousness, and we could discuss them, if certain individuals didn't derail every thread they enter to bloviate about their personal obsessions...

It seems to me that only firm moderation can manage that kind of thing.

[Ethos_]

There are many intriguing scientific aspects to free will and consciousness, and we could discuss them, if certain individuals didn't derail every thread they enter to bloviate about their personal obsessions...

It seems to me that only firm moderation can manage that kind of thing.

Agreed...................we patiently wait!!!!!!!!!!

[cheryl j]

Some neurologists say that the big questions or the hard problem of consciousness or free will may be solved by answering the easy ones, and when I see articles like this, I tend to agree. If it doesn't explain free will, it does seem to explain why we feel as though we have it. It also demonstrates top-down control, something that critics of reductionist neuroscience say is missing.

Pinpointing the brain's arbitrator: Reliability weighed before brain centers given control
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/02/140205133254.htm

"With the results from those tests in hand, the researchers were able to compare the fMRI data and choices made by the subjects against several computational models they constructed to account for behavior. The model that most accurately matched the experimental data involved the two brain systems making separate predictions about which action to take in a given situation. Receiving signals from those systems, the arbitrator kept track of the reliability of the predictions by measuring the difference between the predicted and actual outcomes for each system. It then used those reliability estimates to determine how much control each system should exert over the individual's behavior. In this model, the arbitrator ensures that the system making the most reliable predictions at any moment exerts the greatest degree of control over behavior.

'What we're showing is the existence of higher-level control in the human brain,' says Sang Wan Lee, lead author of the new study and a postdoctoral scholar in neuroscience at Caltech. 'The arbitrator is basically making decisions about decisions.'"

[Ethos_]

'What we're showing is the existence of higher-level control in the human brain,' says Sang Wan Lee, lead author of the new study and a postdoctoral scholar in neuroscience at Caltech. 'The arbitrator is basically making decisions about decisions.'"[/size]

What I found very interesting was the observation that habitual behavior was more or less the default mode for this decision making. And only when more goal directed behavior was recognized as necessary was the arbitrator given authority over this default mode. Curious what complex beings we humans are......................?

[dlorde]

It seems to me that we tend to become consciously aware of the decision-making process (rather than just its results) when such arbitration is necessary. When the options are very closely matched in estimated suitability, or neither appears sufficiently reliable to enable a good choice, additional resources must be recruited to supply additional information to weigh on either side, or to increase the apparent reliability of an option. The more additional resources are needed, or the wider the mental net is cast for more information, the more widespread the neural activation and the more consciously aware we become of it.

I find this most noticeable when there is a trivial choice to be made, about which I have no preference, or where my preference is balanced by some other (often social) constraint, and yet there is pressure (often social) to make a definite choice (e.g. "Chocolate or strawberry?" or "Would you like the last biscuit?"). In these situations, instead of becoming aware of responding with an obvious answer (e.g. "No" to, "Do you take sugar?"), I become aware of casting around for some new data to enable an acceptable choice, and thinking, "this ought to be really easy - but it's not..."

An interesting take on free will I heard recently:

"If you do what you do because of the way you are, then to change what you do you must change the way you are, but to change the way you are you must change what you do, and you do what you do because of the way you are..."

[Ethos_]

I find this most noticeable when there is a trivial choice to be made, about which I have no preference, or where my preference is balanced by some other (often social) constraint, and yet there is pressure (often social) to make a definite choice (e.g. "Chocolate or strawberry?"

This is the conflict of choice we all face isn't it, to abide by the social norm or to make our decision based upon individual preference. Causes one to consider the difference between the personal aim and the hive mentality. Are we as a society evolving toward a hive structure when social aims become dominant in our thought processes? And if so, will we ultimately grow into a social structure similar to a very advanced bee hive or ant colony? Will the individual cease to exist as we move closer to the domination of the hive?

An interesting take on free will I heard recently:

"If you do what you do because of the way you are, then to change what you do you must change the way you are, but to change the way you are you must change what you do, and you do what you do because of the way you are..."

Indeed, sounds very deterministic to me and quite logical IMO.

[dlorde]

... Are we as a society evolving toward a hive structure when social aims become dominant in our thought processes? And if so, will we ultimately grow into a social structure similar to a very advanced bee hive or ant colony? Will the individual cease to exist as we move closer to the domination of the hive?

I don't think so - we have too great a variation in individual traits and abilities, and a strong (and sometimes labile) drive towards multiple group affiliation at multiple levels (family, friends, team, interests, beliefs, age group, town, county, country, etc).

An interesting take on free will I heard recently:

"If you do what you do because of the way you are, then to change what you do you must change the way you are, but to change the way you are you must change what you do, and you do what you do because of the way you are..."

Indeed, sounds very deterministic to me and quite logical IMO.

It becomes tricky if the way you are means you can change what you do, i.e. you're the sort of person who can change the way you are - including a (one-time) change to being the sort of person who can't change the way you are.

This exposes a flaw in that kind of thinking about the problem - that there is a self-referential complication; for example, there are the many traits and behaviours that make up the sort of person you are, which may or may not be changeable, and there are also the traits that (may) make you the sort of person who can change those many traits and behaviours (or not).