[dlorde]

Don, you're rambling again; get a grip.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Don, you're rambling again; get a grip.

Meaning ?

Why don't you just try to address my above displayed posts to you , seriously ?

[Ethos_]

anyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.

I'd love to. But first, tell me what it is. I don't buy goods without a meaningful description.

simply because there is no clear definition of it ?
Consciousness, is , per definition, so elusive deceptive and mysterious that it still does escape any unanymous clear definition ,but that does not prevent scientists , philosophers ...from trying to approach it ,their own ways .

Taking that fact into account, maybe you should take this Philosophical question to a Philosophy forum? It does not meet the qualifications to be addressed as a New Theory. This is precisely the reason you're receiving so much grief here Don...... Evidently, the intelligence required to recognize that fact is sorely lacking.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Folks :

Maybe the following might give you some sort of temporary illusory consolation, regarding consciousness :
Our minds creating our minds haha = tautology :
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/22/books/review/book-review-soul-dust-the-magic-of-consciousness-by-nicholas-humphrey.html?_r=0

Or any of these:

http://www.amazon.com/Best-Consciousness-Books-List/lm/R3EGL76VZLSV0T

[Ethos_]

The definition of a theory:

A coherent group of TESTED general propositions, commonly regarded as correct, that can be used as principles of EXPLANATION and PREDICTIONS for a class of phenomena...........................PERIOD

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

anyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.

I'd love to. But first, tell me what it is. I don't buy goods without a meaningful description.

simply because there is no clear definition of it ?
Consciousness, is , per definition, so elusive deceptive and mysterious that it still does escape any unanymous clear definition ,but that does not prevent scientists , philosophers ...from trying to approach it ,their own ways .

Taking that fact into account, maybe you should take this Philosophical question to a Philosophy forum? It does not meet the qualifications to be addressed as a New Theory. This is precisely the reason you're receiving so much grief here Don...... Evidently, the intelligence required to recognize that fact is sorely lacking.

Instead of continuing to play the silly frustrated fool with a grudge or a score to settle , think about the following :

Did it ever occur to you that the philosophy of science or epistemology ,does underly the epistemology of science or that of the scientific method itself, as the writings of Karl Popper and others have been showing ?

Did it ever occur to you that the current false materialist  "all is matter ,including the mind thus "  mainstream 'scientific world view " has therefore been assuming that the "mind is in the brain , or that the mind is just the product of the physical brain's activity " ? = the origin or nature of consciousness is a "scientific " issue thus,so it seems  .

Obviously , cognitive intelligence is not the highest form of intelligence,(cognitive intelligence  you do seem to be relatively lacking as well, since i have to repeat the same stuff to you , over and over again , while you have been failing in grasping just that . ), since the majority of scientists and other people , have been taking the false materialist conception of nature for granted as the 'scientific world view "  .

It takes only one successful falsification to declare any given theory or theory of nature as  false : materialism cannot account for consciousness thus , and hence materialism is false : what parts of the above you are not yet able to understand , if ever ,genius ?

Not to mention your lack of ...imagination as well,to say just that  .


P.S.: Other scientists or philosophers , like Chalmers , Nagel and others , do try to address the issue or hard problem of consciousness , via a non-reductionist naturalist approach .

Science must thus , at least , go through a revolutionary shift of meta-paradigm , not only through a paradigm shift , thanks to the hard problem of consciousness that has been proving the materialist dominating mainstream meta-paradigm in science ,  as ....false thus .

In short :

How come all people here have been failing in grasping the simple above ,for so long now , for months now in fact , during these  long  kilometers long 43 pages of this thread,from here to Japan  ?:

You ,guys , do seriously have to ask this question to yourselves .

What , on earth , is wrong with you , guys , or with your own consciousness, intelligence , imagination ...as not to be able to grasp the simple fact that materialism is false , and hence the current "scientific world view " is also false ,logically,thanks to the hard problem of ...consciousness  .

[cheryl j]

Poor Chalmers can also not realise the fact that no naturalist theory of consciousness, either the reductive or the non-reductive one , can account for consciousness , the poor lad .
He's just moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm

How are you not doing the same? How are you not simply moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm by invoking the immaterial?

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Poor Chalmers can also not realise the fact that no naturalist theory of consciousness, either the reductive or the non-reductive one , can account for consciousness , the poor lad .
He's just moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm

How are you not doing the same? How are you not simply moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm by invoking the immaterial?

Good question  indeed , for a change : i must give you credit for just that ,sweet Cheryl of ours : good thinking,no kidding,i am serious   :

Well,since the materialist "all is matter , including the mind " conception of nature is false ,mainly because materialism cannot account for consciousness ,  then , logically , not -all is matter ,including consciousness thus = consciousness is not material physical or biological = simple logic .

[dlorde]

Why don't you just try to address my above displayed posts to you , seriously ?

I might if I could find something coherent in them to address...

Why don't you answer any of the questions asked of you by anyone here, seriously?

For example: Which of these three statements best describes your stance?

    (1) All aspects of the immaterial can be verified scientifically.
    (2) Some aspects of the immaterial can be verified scientifically, but others cannot.
    (3) No aspects of the immaterial can be verified scientifically.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Why don't you just try to address my above displayed posts to you , seriously ?

I might if I could find something coherent in them to address...

You gotta be kidding me : come on , be serious : RU blind ? Guess so .
I might be the only one here able to see , in this land of the blind-thread haha .
I will become blind myself , if i keep on "living on this land of the blind-thread " ,who knows ?
The worst kind of blindness is that of the ...heart , the latter as not the biological one .
Many seeing people are blind , and vice versa .
You seem to lack the most important sight of them all , the internal one .
I might be your only chance to see the light haha , kidding .
Congratulations .

[Ethos_]

Don Quixote: The chivalrous but UNREALISTIC hero from the novel by Cervantes. Very serious similarities here by name and personality Mr. Don.

[cheryl j]

Poor Chalmers can also not realise the fact that no naturalist theory of consciousness, either the reductive or the non-reductive one , can account for consciousness , the poor lad .
He's just moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm

How are you not doing the same? How are you not simply moving the hard problem of consciousness to another realm by invoking the immaterial?

Good question  indeed , for a change : i must give you credit for just that ,sweet Cheryl of ours : good thinking,no kidding,i am serious   :

Well,since the materialist "all is matter , including the mind " conception of nature is false ,mainly because materialism cannot account for consciousness ,  then , logically , not -all is matter ,including consciousness thus = consciousness is not material physical or biological = simple logic .

Nor does immaterialism account for consciousness. In addition, it has not explained any phenomena. Thus consciousness is not immaterial. Simple logic. 

[cheryl j]

I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible, and I even argue for a form of dualism.
 But this is just part of the scientific process.
Certain sorts of explanation turn out not to work, so we need to embrace other sorts of explanation instead.
 Everything I say here is compatible with the results of contemporary science; our picture of the natural world is broadened, not overturned.
 And this broadening allows the possibility of a naturalistic theory of consciousness that might have been impossible without it.
It seems to me that to ignore the problems of consciousness would be antiscientific; it is in the scientific spirit to face up to them directly.
To those who
suspect that science requires materialism, I ask that you wait and see.
I should note that the conclusions of this work are conclusions, in the strongest sense.

Temperamentally, I am
strongly inclined toward materialist reductive explanation, and I have no strong spiritual or religious inclinations.
For a number of years, I hoped for a materialist theory; when I gave up on this hope, it was quite reluctantly.
 It eventually seemed plain to me that these conclusions were forced on anyone who wants to take consciousness seriously.
 Materialism is a beautiful and compelling view of the world, but to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides.

Source : "The conscious mind " by David J.Chalmers , Introduction .

Again, this is an introduction, which describes what he is about to discuss. Without the argument itself, I'm not sure what your point is in reposting it, other than to say "Hey, look! Someone who once thought materialist mechanisms explained consciousness now thinks otherwise." But your post doesn't include the reasoning behind this change of view, or the view that has replaced it. And no, I do not expect you to post the entire book, but I would expect some attempt on your part to understand his reasons if you are going to use them as evidence for your own position. (I am pleased that you have chosen someone who is not a total crackpot though.)

[dlorde]

Nor does immaterialism account for consciousness. In addition, it has not explained any phenomena. Thus consciousness is not immaterial. Simple logic. 

Indeed, the logic is impeccable, captain. The immaterial cannot be explanatory. Doctor McCoy, would you agree?

Damn it Spock, I'm a doctor, not a logician!

[cheryl j]

More fun quizzes! Which consciousness philosopher are you?

Substance dualism
Substance dualism is the view that there exist two kinds of substance: physical and non-physical (the mind), and subsequently also two kinds of properties which adhere in those respective substances.

Property dualism
Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance - the physical kind - there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties (such as beliefs, desires and emotions) inhere in some physical substances (namely brains).

Emergent materialism
The antithesis of reductionism, emergentism is the idea that increasingly complex structures in the world give rise to the "emergence" of new properties that are something over and above (i.e. cannot be reduced to) their more basic constituents. The concept of emergence dates back to the late 19th century. John Stuart Mill notably argued for an emergentist conception of science in his 1843 System of Logic.Applied to the mind/body relation, emergent materialism is another way of describing the non-reductive physicalist conception of the mind that asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e., organized in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge.

Non-reductive Physicalism
Non-reductive physicalism is the predominant contemporary form of property dualism according to which mental properties are mapped to neurobiological properties, but are not reducible to them. Non-reductive physicalism asserts that mind is not ontologically reducible to matter, in that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between the properties of mind and matter. It asserts that while mental states are physical in that they are caused by physical states, they are not ontologically reducible to physical states. No mental state is the same one thing as some physical state, nor is any mental state composed merely from physical states and phenomena.

Anomalous MonismMost contemporary non-reductive physicalists subscribe to a position called anomalous monism (or something very similar to it). Unlike epiphenomenalism, which renders mental properties causally redundant, anomalous monists believe that mental properties make a causal difference to the world. The position was originally put forward by Donald Davidson in his 1970 paper Mental Events, which stakes an identity claim between mental and physical tokens based on the notion of supervenience.

Biological Naturalism
Another argument for Non-Reductive Physicalism has been expressed by John Searle, who is the advocate of a distinctive form of physicalism he calls biological naturalism. His view is that although mental states are not ontologically reducible to physical states, they are causally reducible (see causality). He believes the mental will ultimately be explained through neuroscience. This world view does not necessarily fall under property dualism, and therefore does not necessarily make him a "property dualist". He has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike. But he thinks the comparison is misleading.[1]

Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine about mental-physical causal relations, which holds that one or more mental states and their properties are the byproducts (or epiphenomena) of the states of a closed physical system, and are not causally reducible to physical states (do not have any influence on physical states). According to this view mental properties are as such real constituents of the world, but they are causally impotent; while physical causes give rise to mental properties like sensations, volition, ideas, etc., such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further - they are causal dead ends.
The position is credited to English biologist Thomas Huxley (Huxley 1874), who analogised mental properties to the whistle on a steam locomotive. The position found favour amongst scientific behaviourists over the next few decades, until behaviourism itself fell to the cognitive revolution in the 1960s. Recently, epiphenomenalism has gained popularity with those struggling to reconcile non-reductive physicalism and mental causation.

Panpsychist property dualism
Panpsychism is the view that all matter has a mental aspect, or, alternatively, all objects have a unified center of experience or point of view. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, since it regards everything as having both mental and physical properties. However, some panpsychists say mechanical behaviour is derived from primitive mentality of atoms and molecules — as are sophisticated mentality and organic behaviour, the difference being attributed to the presence or absence of complex structure in a compound object. So long as the reduction of non-mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not strictly a form of property dualism; otherwise it is.

[cheryl j]

Some thoughts on Chalmers.

I don’t have Chalmer’s book, but he is often described  as  a property dualist, (or as he prefers “a naturalistic dualist.”) He is a property dualist, and not a substance dualist, because while he holds that there is only one type of substance -physical matter (sorry, Don),  there are properties of objects which cannot (in principle) be explained in physical terms and therefore  the mental is not ontologically reducible to physical. To be honest, I have a hard time seeing how this differs tremendously from emergent properties or non-reductive physicalism, but the difference is sometimes explained like this : “Chalmer’s property dualism boils down to the idea that consciousness naturally supervenes, but does not logically supervene on the physical.” And to illustrate what that actually means, he employs the famous philosophical zombie argument.  Because philosophical zombies are logically possible, consciousness cannot logically supervene on the physical. If consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, then one cannot reduce facts about consciousness to physical facts; therefore, one cannot explain the occurrence of consciousness just by appeal to the physical facts.

I must confess I hate logical arguments based simply on the conceivability of something, because the devil is always in the details. Just because something is not logically contradictory (like an married bachelor) and is conceivable (like a flying toaster, inverted qualia) does not mean it is not contradictory or impossible on some other level (like water that freezes at 200 degrees)

Someone like David Cooper might argue that philosophical zombies are not just conceivable but probable,  in the future with AI. Dennett says they already exist, and we’re it. Or maybe he just says that once in a while to piss off philosophers. I think his actual view of consciousness is better reflected in his statement “The time has come to put the burden of proof squarely on those who persist in using the term,” that is, he’s not going to worry about it until somebody comes up with a  definition of consciousness that isn’t hopelessly confused.

Ramachandron might actually pose a bigger threat to the philosophical zombie argument than Dennett.  Ramachandran’s  research suggests that a philosophical zombie would not be like us in every way except for the absence of conscious experience,  because a neurological equivalent of a philosophical zombie cannot function the same as us.Even when the parts of the brain responsible for receiving stimuli, processing basic information about it, and executing actions, is intact, consciousness appears to be required for flexibility of choice.  A Ramachandran example is blind sight in which patients can make completely accurate “guesses” about the identity of objects they claim they cannot see,  even tell which direction objects are moving, but strangely, cannot use this information to make choices.  In other words, there may be no such thing as a zombie who could be like us in every other respect besides consciousness. One can't say Ramachandron's findings conclusively prove this, but if it were the case, it would put Chalmers in a bad position.






 “

[dlorde]

I must confess I hate logical arguments based simply on the conceivability of something, because the devil is always in the details. Just because something is not logically contradictory (like an married bachelor) and is conceivable (like a flying toaster, inverted qualia) does not mean it is not contradictory or impossible on some other level (like water that freezes at 200 degrees)

I agree. All fictional and imaginary things are conceivable, but I don't see how that necessarily has any bearing on reality.

Someone like David Cooper might argue that philosophical zombies are not just conceivable but probable,  in the future with AI. Dennett says they already exist, and we’re it. Or maybe he just says that once in a while to piss off philosophers. I think his actual view of consciousness is better reflected in his statement “The time has come to put the burden of proof squarely on those who persist in using the term,” that is, he’s not going to worry about it until somebody comes up with a  definition of consciousness that isn’t hopelessly confused.

I sympathise with Dennett - a reasonable definition is lacking, but there clearly is something we call consciousness, and we know what it feels like (although there's evidence that it misattributes its agency, and possibly a good deal more).

Ramachandron might actually pose a bigger threat to the philosophical zombie argument than Dennett.  Ramachandran’s  research suggests that a philosophical zombie would not be like us in every way except for the absence of conscious experience...  In other words, there may be no such thing as a zombie who could be like us in every other respect besides consciousness. One can't say Ramachandron's findings conclusively prove this, but if it were the case, it would put Chalmers in a bad position.

Yes; a philosophical zombie may be conceivable, but it seems to me that a creature that is behaviourally indistinguishable from a known conscious creature must itself be conscious because that level of behavioural complexity requires consciousness - or to put it another way, consciousness comes with the level of complexity required to support those behaviours. Also, the energetics of evolutionary development suggests that consciousness is unlikely to be an 'optional extra' that has no significant advantage, yet consumes energy resource.

The alternative is to take Dennett's reversed approach and ask the question if there is no discernable difference between two creatures, and one definitely is not conscious (i.e. p zombie), we can have no grounds to say the other is conscious (also Ockham's Razor). And if a p zombie is possible, then why shouldn't this argument apply to all other humans? and since you are not, fundamentally, different from them, it should apply to you too. Thus you are such a p zombie, and so your feeling of consciousness must be an illusion...

Of course, this is unsatisfactory because it doesn't account for subjective experience, and calling it an illusion isn't particularly helpful, as we must still ask how this 'illusion' arises. It becomes more a semantic argument over labels than a philosophical one. I suspect Dennett is using this argument as a provocative demonstration of where the philosophical zombie idea leads without a robust definition of consciousness.

[alancalverd]

what constructive contribution has philosophy made to our lives?

None, ever. Vide supra et infra.

Applied philosophy has, however, been the cause of many ills, from individual insanity to major wars.

[alancalverd]

Cheryl

there are properties of objects which cannot (in principle) be explained in physical terms

Why can't I think of any examples? There are plenty of things I can't explain in practice, but I have no reason to believe that they can't be explained at all by anyone ever.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Don Quixote: The chivalrous but UNREALISTIC hero from the novel by Cervantes. Very serious similarities here by name and personality Mr. Don.

Indeed : what a miracle that we do seem to agree with each other this time, for a change .
We are all some or other forms of Cervantes' Don Quixote ,from time to time , that's 1 of the reasons why i did choose this nick ,and i did talk about just that on many occasions as well .

Materialism is , ironically enough , a very tragic -hilarious form of Don Quixotism , on  imaginary crusades or on materialist "holy wars " campaigns against imaginary enemies : religions and God , by reducing everything to just matter , including consciousness thus,and then, afterwards by pretending to refute  religions and God ,materialism  had reduced to matter haha : how convenient and handy  .

Materialism that has thus been fighting against material windmills ,materialism has been taking for religions or God .

When materialism takes its own false materialist conception of nature for granted as the "scientific world view " , it's pretty logical to assume that materialism has "beaten " religions and God : a Don Quixotian materialist delusion thus ,like no other ..