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It almost seems that Stapp and others are tip toeing around what the conscious agency actually consists of, or they don't really care, and are just interested in seeing if it is possible to work in free will in some way. Stapp is not shy about admitting that objective.
And I agree he is looking for a way to re-instate personal accountability he feels is being undermined by neuroscience.
Let's look at the statistics of an "anticipatory response" (y) to emotive pictures. Suppose I have equal numbers of neutral (X) and emotive (Y) images, displayed at random. After a few trials, my subject will have a pretty good idea that they are about equally likely, so if he sees the sequence XX, YX, or XXX he will expect the next image to be Y. Therefore the probability of an anticipatory y response will be greater than then actual incidence of Y images. Summed over a large number of trials, this will look like "the subject correctly anticipated Y significantly more than chance" but the statistically correct inference is that time is unidirectional and people try to impose pattern on random events. Why else would anyone choose lottery numbers based on previous outcomes? And why do lotteries make a profit? The problem with the experiment is that there is no true zero.
... I firmly believe he has a secret religious agenda.
Quote from: Ethos_ on 17/12/2013 16:54:33... I firmly believe he has a secret religious agenda.You reckon? []
I don't see much of a problem with simple personal accountability per se - if an individual can be shown to have acted [without coercion], they can be said to be responsible for that action, and can be asked to account for it (although they may not be able to account for it). For me, the problem arises when you start with an abstraction of cultural convenience, like 'moral responsibility', reify it, generate another (ill-defined, incoherent) abstraction to justify it (i.e. free will), then insist on finding neural or physical correlates for it. By tweaking the concept of free will to make it coherent, it can quite easily be applied, and arises naturally out of even an entirely deterministic behavioural model without any need to find explanatory gaps or uncertainties in quantum mechanics to wedge it into. The question is whether making it coherent spoils the party for moral responsibility - and I rather suspect it does.
It seems to me that much of the effort to support a dualist interpretation for free will in particular, and consciousness in general, is driven by a perceived need to see only consciousness as the 'real' you, and the non-conscious processes as simply some kind of dumb janitor behind the scenes, emptying the bins and handling the mail.
However, evidence has been accumulating for some time that it is the sum of the non-conscious processes in the brain that constitute the 'real' you, and that conscious awareness is an evolutionary latecomer to the feast providing a reflective awareness of what the whole is doing. It's less an agent, more a representative or monitor, providing a unified view of the self; The only 'illusion' of consciousness is the way things are arranged so that the conscious process feels it is the whole rather than being only an awareness of the whole, but that's the way it has to be if you want an integrated conscious sense of self. This misplaced sense of sole agency can be strong enough to produce a sense of complete independence - the concept of a non-physical consciousness that carries on after death - but taking the credit for the team is one thing, that's how it's explicitly set up, but the idea that it can function without them is like the Face of L'Oreal thinking she's the one who makes and sells the perfumes & cosmetics and can still make and sell them even if all the factories burn down and the company goes bust...So I see the 'real you' as a team effort involving all brain processes, and consciousness is one process on the team who's kept informed, is allowed to sit in on the important meetings, and is led to believe it's all his own work
The courts have always taken into account whether a person could control their actions, or if they were unable to because of insanity, mental retardation,brain tumors or brain injuries, youth, even the "heat of the moment" or panic. Neuroscience may have nudged that dividing line in finding more biological causes for behavior. But all I think will happen, and in many respects it already has, is that justice will based less on determining responsibility, and more on whether the person has proven they are a danger to others. It may also come to rely more on the idea of modifiability.If a child scribbles on the wall, we assume this behavior can be modified, either by positive or negative reinforcement, or simply by explaining that paper is for drawing, not walls. The behavior is modifiable. If he scribbled on the wall because he was sleep walking, nothing we say or do the next morning is likely to prevent it from happening again the next time he sleeps walks. We can say he wasn't in control of his actions, but we could also simply say it is not modifiable behavior, other than by directly intervening, placing the crayons out of reach, etc.
So there we have it - when the going gets interesting, cut and run. Two posts, one long enough to answer at least some of the questions, instead used to make a theatrical lovey ('darlings, I love you all, mwaah!') exit; the other, an incoherent insult [)]No surprises there, then []
I wonder if we take our innate resistance to being compelled or restricted from doing things against our will by others and turn it against ourselves or the idea of our own subconscious.Sometimes I even wonder if people's fear of their own subconscious acting without their awareness or consent is related to a primitive fear of parasites.
In addition to providing a unified sense of self, the concept of free will might result simply because I can't foresee the future. Because I don't know exactly what I'll be doing tomorrow or next week or next year, and nothing appears to be constraining me, I believe I can control what happens or what I decide to do. Even if someone successfully predicts what I do or how I react, I still feel that it could have been otherwise, especially if I didn't predict it.
If it's an illusion, it's an oddly inescapable one, except by rephrasing the question, as you have, and asking "free from what?" Do we really want to be free from all causation - learning, past experience, genetic abilities, automatic behavior that allows us to walk across the room without issuing specific instructions to each muscle group?
The only thing I can think of that most people wish to be free of is reacting impulsively in ways they will later regret, kind of like worrying that there is a rogue or deficient player on your team. Casinos often hire pretty women because statistically, men spend more money and take greater risks in the presence of an attractive women, even if they are not aware of doing so, or consciously trying to impress her. Conversely, I once heard of a stock broker who never worked at home because he knew that environment would make him too conservative and risk averse. Does trying to stack ones own the deck, so to speak, support the idea of free will, or is ultimately a contradiction, or make no sense at all?
I will be watching you , from time to time , whenever i can...
And when i will come back, if i come back, i do promise that i will be delivering some challenging material that will be rocking your materialist sand castles , to the point where its sand grains will be flying in all directions ,thanks to the stormy wind that i will be triggering ...
I will be watching you , from time to time , whenever i can : let's see whether you, guys , can or not progress in this discussion without me ............
Whenever i am gone , this discussion becomes clinically dead , untill i come back and revive it again .
Let's hope , it wouldn't be the case this time .
P.S.: I hope that some "geniuses " here such as Ethos will be decent enough to leave this thread , since he cannot ,obviously , understand simple statements ....while he keeps on making wild and silly specualtions accusations ....in order to hide his paradoxical ignorance in the process ...
I don't quite understand what you mean here.
I also liked the fact that I arrived at work the same time I left home. It seemed to make the trip shorter. And he said, "Yeah, but then the trip home is twice as long!" "I don't care about that," I said "because I'm never in a big rush then. I only need to get some where fast in the morning."
... my five senses ...