[cheryl j]

"The shift is from a local, reductionistic, deterministic conception of nature in which consciousness has no logical place, and can do nothing but passively watch a preprogrammed course of events, to a nonlocal, nonreductionistic, nondeterministic, conception of nature in which there is a perfectly natural place for consciousness, a place that allows each conscious event, conditioned, but not bound, by any known law of nature, to grasp a possible large-scale metastable pattern of neuronal activity in the brain, and convert its status from “possible” to “actual”."

(underlining mine)

How that "grasping" takes place is the most interesting part, not just, as he later says "a technical matter that I do not want to enter into right here."

Penrose should at least get some points for trying, instead of just dismissing those pesky details.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

I might be convinced to read Stapp on the subject if someone can provide a one-line quote: what is Stapp's definition of consciousness?

The mental is just the other side of reality ,your other side as well,  the mental that's irreducible to the physical : there is nothing supernatural or mystic about it = normal .

So, scientists have been trying lately to try to figure out how consciousness and brain do interact with each other somehow : QM might be able to shed some light on just that somehow ,via the mental causal effects on matter , and hence on body and brain , at the micro quantum level ,via a top-down form of causation ............

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

"The shift is from a local, reductionistic, deterministic conception of nature in which consciousness has no logical place, and can do nothing but passively watch a preprogrammed course of events, to a nonlocal, nonreductionistic, nondeterministic, conception of nature in which there is a perfectly natural place for consciousness, a place that allows each conscious event, conditioned, but not bound, by any known law of nature, to grasp a possible large-scale metastable pattern of neuronal activity in the brain, and convert its status from “possible” to “actual”."

(underlining mine)

How that "grasping" takes place is the most interesting part, not just, as he later says "a technical matter that I do not want to enter into right here."

Penrose should at least get some points for trying, instead of just dismissing those pesky details.

Stapp tackled that issue later on in that book of his : i will try to find the relevant quotes on the subject in question .
Neuroscientists still view the mind-brain issue just through the mechanical determinist approximately valid and fundamentally incorrect classical physics ' point of view .

[Ethos_]

The mental is just the other side of reality ,your other side as well,

The other side of reality......................Just what exactly is that supposed to mean?

[cheryl j]

date=1388683056]



He's wrong : here below is why :

Chris Carter's explanation doesn't address or explain Donald's point specifically. All he says is that "it doesn't." That's not a "why"

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

10 Quantum Theory
and the Place of Mind in Nature:



Classical physics can be viewed as a triumph of the idea that mind should be
excluded from science, or at least from the physical sciences. Although the
founders of modern science, such as Descartes and Newton, were not so rash
as to proclaim that mind has nothing to do with the unfolding of nature, the
scientists of succeeding centuries, emboldened by the spectacular success
of the mechanical view of nature, were not so timid, and today we are
seeing even in psychology a strong movement towards “materialism”, i.e.,
toward the idea that “mind is brain”. But while psychology has been moving
toward the mechanical concepts of nineteenth-century physics, physics itself
has moved in just the opposite direction.
The mentalistic bias of contemporary physics is perhaps best summarized
in Heisenberg’s statement that
we are finally led to believe that the laws of nature that we formulate mathematically
in quantum theory deal no longer with the particles themselves
but with our knowledge of the elementary particles . . . The conception of
the objective reality of the particles has thus evaporated in a curious way,
not into a fog of some new, obscure, or not yet understood reality concept,
but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer
the behavior of the elementary particles but rather our knowledge of this
behaviour.1
This shift in the physicist’s conception of nature, or at least in his conception
of his theory about nature, away from the mechanical and toward
the experiential, is expressed also by Bohr’s statements:
In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of
phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the
multifold aspects of experience.2
. . . the goal of science is to augment and order our experience . . .3
Bohr and Heisenberg each sought to deflate the idea that either he, or
quantum theory itself, was asserting that the character of nature herself was
essentially mental. Bohr emphasized that quantum theory was merely a tool
for making predictions about our experiences:
194 10 Quantum Theory and the Place of Mind in Nature
Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and
electrodynamics merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expectations
about observations obtained under well defined conditions specified
by classical physical concepts.4
Heisenberg went even further:
If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event we have to realize
that the word “happens”. . . applies to the physical not the psychical act
of observation, and we may say that the transition from the “possible” to
the “actual” takes place as soon as the interaction between the [atomic]
object and the measuring device, and thereby with the rest of the world, has
come into play; it is not connected with the act of registration of the result
in the mind of the observer. The discontinuous change in the probability
function, however, takes place with the act of registration, because it is the
discontinuous change in our knowledge in the instant of registration that has
its image in the discontinuous change in the probability function.5
The final sentence affirms Heisenberg’s position that the mathematical
probability function of quantum theory represents “our knowledge”. However,
the statements that precede it affirm his belief that there are also some
real “happenings” outside the minds of the human observers, and that these
external events have the character of transitions of the “possible” to the
“actual”.
To describe these external events themselves in mathematical form one
can introduce the idea of an objective wave function—awave function that is
like the one of Bohr and Heisenberg with respect to its mathematical properties
(i.e., evolution via the Schr¨odinger equation etc.), but that represents the
external world itself, and changes when the transitions from “possible” to
“actual” take place, rather than with the registration of a result in the mind
of the observer/scientist. This procedure would seem to be a reasonable
step toward providing a conceivable description of nature herself, since it
would allow the detailed and precise mathematical properties represented in
quantum theory to be understood directly as mathematical characteristics of
the world itself. This transformation can be termed the ontologicalization
of quantum theory: it converts that theory from a structure conceived to be
a mere tool for scientists—a tool to be used for very limited purposes—to a
putative description of nature herself.
If we follow this tack, and endeavor to construe the mathematical structure
represented by quantum theory as a feature of the world itself, then we
may ask: What is the nature of that world? What sort of world do we live
in?
The world represented by an ontogically interpreted quantum theory,
with the quantum jumps representing transitions from “possible” to “actual”,
would be a strange sort of beast. The evolving quantum state, al10
Quantum Theory and the Place of Mind in Nature 195
though controlled in part by mathematical laws that are direct analogs of
the laws that in classical physics govern the motion of “matter”, no longer
represents anything substantive. Instead, this evolving quantum state would
represent the “potentialities” and “probabilities” for actual events. Thus the
“primal stuff” represented by the evolving quantum state would be idealike
in character rather than matterlike, apart from its conformity to mathematical
rules. On the other hand, mathematics has seemed, at least since the
time of Plato, to be more a resident of a world of ideas, than a structure in
the world of matter. Hence even this mathematical aspect of nature can be
regarded as basically idealike. Indeed, quantum theory provides a detailed
and explicit example of how an idealike primal stuff can be controlled in
part by mathematical rules based in spacetime.
The actual events in quantum theory are likewise idealike: each such
happening is a choice that selects as the “actual”, in a way not controlled by
any known or purported mechanical law, one of the potentialities generated
by the quantum-mechanical law of evolution.
In view of these uniformly idealike characteristics of the quantumphysical
world, the proper answer to our question “What sort of world
do we live in?” would seem to be this: “We live in an idealike world, not a
matterlike world.” The material aspects are exhausted in certain mathematical
properties, and these mathematical features can be understood just as
well (and in fact better) as characteristics of an evolving idealike structure.
There is, in fact, in the quantum universe no natural place for matter. This
conclusion, curiously, is the exact reverse of the circumstance that in the
classical physical universe there was no natural place for mind.
These remarks may appear to be nothing but a word game. But I think
not. The change in our words indicates a change in our perception. By
changing our perception of the kind of world we live in we change our
perception of the possibilities. If some of the possibilities opened up by this
altered perception of the basic nature of the physical world can be actualized
within science then this change ofwords and perceptions will certainly count
for something.
One possibility immediately opened up by this change is the possibility
of integrating human consciousness into the physical sciences. This possibility
was effectively blocked off when physical science meant, in the final
analysis, classical physics. For there is an enormous conceptual gulf between
the classical physicist’s conceptualization of the physical world and
the psychologist’s conceptualization of the mentalworld. The essence of the
classical physicist’s conception of matter is its local-reductionistic nature:
the idea the physical world can be decomposed into elementary local quantities
that interact only with immediately adjacent neighbors. But conscious

thoughts appear to be complex wholes, not merely at the functional level
but also as directly experienced. Insofar as the experienced quality of a
conscious thought constitutes its essence it is not possible to conceptualize
a thought as a resident of the physical world, as that world was conceived of
in classical physics. To bring a human conscious thought into the physicist’s
conception of the physical world one needs, within that conception, something
having, in its essence, the integrity and complexity of that thought.
The world as it is conceived of in classical physics is essentially reductive
and therefore admits no essentially complex wholes.
This problem of unity is brought into clear focus by Daniel Dennett’s
book Consciousness Explained.6 The thesis of the book is that brain processes
proceed in “parallel pandemonium”, with each of the processing units
doing its own thing. The problem is then to bring the outputs of all these
processes together into the integrated forms that we seem to experience in
our stream of conscious thoughts. Dennett argues that this integration is, in
fact, not possible, and hence that our thoughts cannot be what they seem to
be.
This conclusion may indeed be what would emerge from a classical
conception of what is going on in a human brain. But quantum theory opens
completely new vistas. For the actual event in quantum theory can perfectly
well be the actualization, as a unit, of an entire high-level pattern of neural
firings. Such a pattern could have all of the complexity of a conscious
thought, and yet be, in essence, a single actualized structure. From a logical
point of view we have, therefore, the foundation of a rational way of linking
conscious thoughts into the physicist’s conception of nature.
It is, of course, one thing to have the logical basis of a rational way of
integrating conscious thoughts into the physical sciences and another thing to
have a consistent and coherent theory that really achieves this. There are the
problems of explaining the linkage of brain states to the functional efficacy
of the conscious thoughts and to the experiential qualities of conscious
thoughts. Yet neither of these problems seems to be in principle beyond the
bounds of rational explanation, within the quantum framework, which as
explained earlier provides an intricate tapestry of idealike qualities.
The line of thinking described above has led to a serious attempt to bring
human conscious experience into the quantum-mechanical description of
nature.7 This endeavor, though hardly complete, is, I believe, sufficiently
successful to warrant considerable optimism as regards the prospects of
ultimate success: a great deal of empirical information that had seemed
very puzzling from a classical point of view now falls neatly into place.
In view of these developments I believe that the verdict of history will
be that the Copenhagen interpretation was a half-way house: it was a right
face that was the first step of an about face.
The scientific community has, rightly, a considerable amount of inertia.
A complete turn around on the basic classical idea that mind should be
rigorously excluded from the theory of the workings of the material universe
was neither possible norwarranted during the 1920s and 1930s. Any attempt
to correlate the revolutionary findings in the domain of atomic physics to
the subtleties of the connection between mind and brain would have been
extravagantly premature in view of the then-prevailing rudimentary state of
our understanding of the workings of the brain. The appropriate course of
action was first to see how far the new quantum ideas would carry us in
domains that were under better empirical control.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

During the past thirty years, however, the Copenhagen interpretation has
lost a good deal of its hold on the minds of physicists. The words of Murray
Gell-Mann give an indication of this shift:
Niels Bohr brain-washed a whole generation of physicists into believing
that the problem had been solved fifty years ago.8
The reasons for this change in attitude are many and diverse. One
important reason is the expansion of the scope of quantum theory. The
theory was originally designed to cover the domain of atomic physics, and
was therefore concerned with things that were far beyond the range of our
direct observation, and were thus approachable only indirectly with the aid
of sophisticated measuring devices. Now, however, a problem that looms
large in the minds of physicists is quantum gravity, which deals with quantum
effects at the creation of the universe, and in the evolution of black holes.
These phenomena are quite unlike the laboratory experiments in atomic
physics that physicists were focussing on during the beginning of the century.
The atomic-physics format of preparation-then-measurement fails to apply
to these new problems. On the other hand, the ontological approach is far
more demanding in terms of logical cohesion. The additional constraints
imposed by the demand for a coherent ontology can provide guidance in our
attempts to extend physical theory into the interesting new domains.
A second reason for the loosening of the grip of the Copenhagen interpretation
is the fallout from the 1964 paper of John Bell.9 The startling
character of Bell’s results caused physicists to take a careful look at the
whole Bohr–Einstein controversy, and this left many of them with an uneasy
sense that something important was perhaps being obscured by Bohr’s
subtle epistemological reasonings, which did not clearly do justice to the
arguments of Einstein pertaining to locality.

A third reason for the fading influence of the Copenhagen interpretation
is the construction by David Bohm of a thoroughly realistic model that
reproduces all of the predictions of quantum theory.10 This model laid to
rest an opinion that was in the background of Copenhagen thinking, namely
the idea that it was simply impossible to understand atomic phenomena in a
realistic way. Although most physicists did not accept the idea that Bohm’s
simple model describes the way things really work, they were nonetheless
quickly disabused of the impression that Bohr (or von Neumann) had showed
that all realistic approaches were necessarily doomed to fail.
A fourth reason lies in the philosophical climate of the times. During
the early part of the last century physicists were reeling from the impact of
the loss of the “ether” and “absolute time”. The whole idea that the universe
could be understood in a completely clear mechanical way had been
shattered. How could there be waves in a void: waves in a space devoid of
medium? How could one understand the unfolding of our thoughts if there
were no similar unfolding of nature herself; i.e., if the whole of spacetime
history already “exists”, as relativity theory seemed to require. The swallowing
of such mysteries seemed to condition physicists not to balk at the
even greater mysteries that quantum theory left unresolved. Furthermore,
the parallel behavioristic movement in psychology, which also focussed on
measurable quantities at the expense of any understanding of the unfolding
stream of conscious thoughts, seemed to place all of science on the same
operational track.
Now, however, the behaviorist approach to psychology seems to have
failed, for technical reasons. In psychology as in physics scientists are
finding that increasingly complex models are needed to account for the
complexity of the empirical data. But in the search for suitable complex
models some orientation is needed. The data alone is insufficient: one needs
some philosophy, and not merely an austere philosophy that recommends
exclusive focussing upon the empirical facts obtained in a single narrow
discipline. The insufficiency of the data in the various narrow disciplines,
taken separately, is forcing scientists to bring into their theorizing information
from an increasingly broad band of fields. Now in physics, for example,
the problem of the innermost structure of the atoms is intertwined with the
problem of the birth of the entire universe. Particle physics, astrophysics,
and cosmology have merged into one field, at least at the level of theory.
Bold conceptions of large scope are needed to tie all these things together.
The epistemological formulation of the Copenhagen interpretation seems,
in the face of this complex situation, insufficiently helpful. Einstein’s words
in this connection are worth recalling:

It is my opinion that the contemporary quantum theory by means of certain
definitely laid down basic concepts, which on the whole are taken over from
classical physics, constitutes an optimum formulation of [certain] connections.
I believe, however, that this theory offers no useful point of departure
for future development.
If what Einstein was judging to be insufficient was a science based upon
the separation of the world into an ineffable nonclassical reality, and a thenunexplained
classical character of our perceptions of that reality, then his
judgement probably accords with the contemporary developments in science.
But if, on the other hand, the nonclassical mathematical regularities
identified by quantum theory are accepted as characteristics of the world
itself, a world whose primal stuff is therefore essentially idealike, and if,
moreover, these mathematical properties account in a natural and understandable
way for the classical characteristic of our conscious perceptions,
as they seem to do, then we appear to have found in quantum theory the
foundation for a science that may be able to deal successfully in a mathematically
and logically coherent way with the full range of scientific thought,
from atomic physics, to biology, to cosmology, including also the area that
had been so mysterious within the framework of classical physics, namely
the connection between processes in human brains and the stream of human
conscious experience.

Henry Stapp

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

The Copenhagen interpretation haha
Come on, Niels Bohr ...even you could deliver some non-sense ,no wonder , being just a human , so ...

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

1 more thing , just concerning the collapse of the wave function : are  the observing or  measuring device + the observer human not made of atoms ,sub-atoms .....themselves ?
So, how can't they not have effects on the observed ?
In the case of the human observer scientist , how can his mind or consciousness not have causal effects on the observed as well ?
In short :
We do only get our own human interpretations of what's going on regarding the objective reality as a whole, including and especially at the quantum level ...
See the excerpts of Stapp on the subject above .

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

The stream of knowledge is heading toward a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look
more like a great thought than like a machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental
intruder into the realm of matter; we ought rather hail it as the governor of the realm of matter.
PHYSICIST JAMES JEANS

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

The mental is just the other side of reality ,your other side as well,

The other side of reality......................Just what exactly is that supposed to mean?

Reality , including you and i , is both material physical and non-material non-physical mental at the same time .
You're not just your physical material biological brain and body , but also a consciousness that's irreducible to the physical or to the material : your own consciousness is more fundamental than your physical brain or body can ever be : see that quote of that physicist here above on the subject .

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

date=1388683056]



He's wrong : here below is why :

Chris Carter's explanation doesn't address or explain Donald's point specifically. All he says is that "it doesn't." That's not a "why"

DETERMINISM AND THE ROLE OF THE OBSERVER:



Quantum mechanics replaces the deterministic universe described by classical physics with a
probabilistic universe. This is the idea that the behavior and various properties of subatomic systems
and particles cannot be predicted precisely, that only a range of probable values can be specified. If
you roll a series of marbles at a hill at less than a certain critical velocity, all the marbles will roll
back down, and if you roll the marbles at more than the critical velocity, all the marbles will make it
over the hill. In our classical macroscopic world, either they all get over or they all fall back. Things
are not so simple at the quantum level.*16
For instance, if subatomic particles such as electrons are fired at a potential barrier at a given
velocity, it may not be possible to say with certainty whether an individual electron will pass through
the barrier. Fire the electrons at a low enough velocity and most will be reflected, although a minority
will pass through; at a high enough velocity most will pass through; and at some intermediate velocity
about half will pass through and half will be reflected. But for any individual electron (out of a group
of apparently identical electrons), all we can specify is the probability that the electron will pass
through.
Another example of quantum randomness is radioactive decay. Say we have radioactive uranium
isotope A that decays into isotope B with a half-life of one hour. One hour later, half of the uranium
atoms will have decayed into isotope B. By all the known methods of physics, all of the uranium
isotope A atoms appeared to be identical, yet one hour later, half have decayed and half are
unchanged. The half-life of isotope A is highly predictable in a statistical sense, yet the precise time at
which any individual atom decays is completely unpredictable.
Probability enters here for a different reason than it does in the tossing of a coin, the throw of dice,
or a horse race: in these cases probability enters because of our lack of precise knowledge of the
original state of the system. But in quantum theory, even if we have complete knowledge of the
original state, the outcome would still be uncertain and only expressible as a probability.
(Philosophers refer to these two sources of uncertainty as subjective and objective probability.
Quantum mechanics suggests that in some situations probability has an objective status.)
Another surprising proposition was that subatomic particles do not have definite properties for
certain attributes, such as position, momentum, or direction of spin, until they are measured. It is not
simply that these properties are unknown until they are observed, instead, they do not exist in any
definite state until they are measured.
This conclusion is based, in part, on the famous “two-slit” experiment, in which electrons are fired
one at a time at a barrier with two slits. Measuring devices on a screen behind the barrier indicate the
electrons seem to behave as waves, going through both slits simultaneously, with patterns of
interference typical of wave phenomena: wave crests arriving simultaneously at the same place in
time will reinforce each other, but waves and troughs arriving simultaneously at the same place will
cancel each other (interference patterns result when two wave fronts meet, for instance, after dropping
two stones into a pond). These waves are only thought of as probability waves, or wave functions, as
they do not carry any energy, and so cannot be directly detected. Only individual electrons are
detected by the measuring device on the screen behind the barrier, but the distribution of numerous
electrons shows the interference patterns typical of waves. It is as though each unobserved electron
exists as a wave until it arrives at the screen to be detected, at which time its actual location (the place
at which the particle is actually observed on the screen) can only be predicted statistically according
to the interference pattern of its wave function.
If, however, a measuring device is placed at the slits, then each electron is observed to pass through
only one slit and no interference pattern in the distribution of electrons is observed. In other words,
electrons behave as waves when not observed, but as particles in a definite location when observed!*17
All quantum entities—electrons, protons, photons, and so on—display this wave-particle duality,
behaving as wave or particle depending on whether they are directly observed.
A variation of this experiment by physicists Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner3 makes this bizarre
point even more clearly. If a wave corresponding to a single atom encounters a semitransparent
reflecting surface (such as a thin film), it can be split into two equal parts, much as a light wave both
going through and reflecting from a windowpane. The two parts of the wave can then be trapped in
two boxes, as shown in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. The wave function at three successive times: t1, t2, and t3.
Since the wave was split equally, if you repeated this process many times, then each time you
looked into the boxes you would find a whole atom in box A about half the time and in box B about
half the time. But according to quantum theory, before you looked the atom was not in any particular
box. The position of the atom is thus an observer-created reality. Its position will also be the same for
all subsequent observers, so it is a reality that depends on an initial observation only.
You may be tempted to think that the atom really was in one box or the other before you looked, but
it can be demonstrated that before observation the atom as a wave was in a “superposition state,” a
state in which it was simultaneously in both box A and box B. Take a pair of boxes that have not been
looked into and cut narrow slits at one end, allowing the waves to simultaneously leak out and
impinge on a photographic film. At points where wave crests from box A and box B arrive together,
they reinforce each other to give a maximum amplitude of the wave function at that point—a
maximum of “waviness.” At some points higher or lower, crests from box A arrive simultaneously
with troughs from box B. The two waves are of opposite signs at these positions and therefore cancel
to give zero amplitude for the wave function at these points.
Since the amplitude of an atom’s wave function at a particular place determines the probability for
the atom to be found there when observed, the atom emerging from the box-pair is more likely to
appear on the film at places where the amplitude of the wave function is large, but can never appear
where it is zero. If we repeat this process with a large number of box-pairs and the same film, many
atoms land to cause darkening of the film near positions of wave function amplitude maximums, but
none appear at wave function minimums. The distribution of darker and lighter areas on the film
forms the interference pattern.
Figure 4.2. The box-pair experiment: (a) waves emanating from slits in the two boxes travel distances da and db and impinge
on a film at F; (b) the resulting pattern formed on the film from many box pairs.
The distribution of electrons on the film will show the interference patterns typical of two waves,
which overlap to cancel each other at some places. To form the interference pattern, the wave function
of each atom had to leak out of both boxes since each and every atom avoids appearing in regions of
the film where the waves from the two boxes cancel. Each and every atom therefore had to obey a
geometrical rule that depends on the relative position of both boxes. So, the argument goes, the atom
had to equally be in both boxes, as an extended wave. If instead of doing this interference experiment
you looked into the pair of boxes, you would have found a whole atom in a particular box, as a
particle. Before you looked, it was in both boxes; after you looked, it was only in one.
Rosenblum and Kuttner sum up the puzzle:
Quantum mechanics is the most battle-tested theory in science. Not a single violation of its
predictions has ever been demonstrated, no matter how preposterous the predictions might seem.
However, anyone concerned with what the theory means faces a philosophical enigma: the socalled
measurement problem, or the problem of observation … before you look we could have
proven—with an interference experiment—that each atom was a wave equally in both boxes.
After you look it was in a single box. It was thus your observation that created the reality of each
atom’s existence in a particular box. Before your observation only probability existed. But it was
not the probability that an actual object existed in a particular place (as in the classical shell
game)—it was just the probability of a future observation of such an object, which does not
include the assumption that the object existed there prior to its observation. This hard-to-accept
observer-created reality is the measurement problem in quantum mechanics.4
Up until the moment of measurement, certain properties of quantum phenomena, such as location,
momentum, and direction of spin, simply exist as a collection of probabilities, known as the wave
function, or state vector. The wave function can be thought of as the probability distribution of all
possible states, such as, for instance, the probability distribution of all possible locations for an
electron.*18
But this is not the probability that the electron is actually at certain locations, instead, it is the
probability that the electron will be found at certain locations. The electron does not have a definite
location until it is observed. Upon measurement, this collection of all possible locations “collapses” to
a single value—the location of the particle that is actually observed.
Physicist Nick Herbert expresses it this way:
The quantum physicist treats the atom as a wave of oscillating possibilities as long as it is not
observed. But whenever it is looked at, the atom stops vibrating and objectifies one of its many
possibilities. Whenever someone chooses to look at it, the atom ceases its fuzzy dance and seems
to “freeze” into a tiny object with definite attributes, only to dissolve once more into a quivering
pool of possibilities as soon as the observer withdraws his attention from it. The apparent
observer-induced change in an atom’s mode of existence is called the collapse of the wave
function.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Measurements thus play a more positive role in quantum mechanics than in classical physics,
because here they are not merely observations of something already present but actually help produce
it. According to one interpretation of quantum mechanics popular among many theorists, it is the
existence of consciousness that introduces intrinsic probability into the quantum world.
This interpretation owes its origin to mathematician John von Neumann, one of the most important
intellectual figures of the twentieth century. In addition to his contributions to pure mathematics, von
Neumann also invented game theory, which models economic and social behavior as rational games,
and made fundamental contributions to the development of the early computers. In the 1930s, von
Neumann turned his restless mind to the task of expressing the newly developed theories of quantum
mechanics in rigorous mathematical form, and the result was his classic book The Mathematical
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. In it he tackled the measurement problem head on and rejected
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which was becoming the orthodox position among
physicists. Although it is somewhat vague, the central tenets of the Copenhagen interpretation seem to
be (1) that all we have access to are the results of observations, and so it is simply pointless to ask
questions about the quantum reality behind those observations, and (2) that although observation is
necessary for establishing the reality of quantum phenomena, no form of consciousness, human or
otherwise, is necessary for making an observation. Rather, an observer is anything that makes a record
of an event, and so it is at the level of macroscopic measuring instruments (such as Geiger counters)
that the actual values of quantum phenomena are randomly set from a range of statistical possibilities.
Von Neumann objected to the Copenhagen interpretation practice of dividing the world in two
parts: indefinite quantum entities on the one side, and measuring instruments that obey the laws of
classical mechanics on the other. He considered a measuring apparatus, a Geiger counter for example,
in a room isolated from the rest of the world but in contact with a quantum system, such as an atom
simultaneously in two boxes. The Geiger counter is set to fire if the atom is found in one box, but to
remain unfired if it is found in the other. This Geiger counter is a physical instrument, hence subject
to the rules of quantum mechanics. Therefore, it should be expected to enter into a superposition state
along with the atom, a state in which it is simultaneously fired and unfired.
Should the Geiger counter be in contact with a device that records whether the counter has fired,
then logically, it too should enter a superposition state that records both situations as existing
simultaneously. Should an observer walk into the room and examine the recording device, this logic
can be continued up the “von Neumann chain” from the recording device, to photons, to the eyes and
brain of the observer, which are also physical instruments that we have no reason to suppose are
exempt from the rules of quantum mechanics. The only peculiar link in the von Neumann chain is the
process by which electrical signals in the brain of the observer become a conscious experience.
Von Neumann argued that the entire physical world is quantum mechanical, so the process that
collapses the wave functions into actual facts cannot be a physical process; instead, the intervention of
something from outside of physics is required. Something nonphysical, not subject to the laws of
quantum mechanics, must account for the collapse of the wave function: the only nonphysical entity in
the observation process that von Neumann could think of was the consciousness of the observer. He
reluctantly concluded that this outside entity had to be consciousness and that prior to observation,
even measuring instruments interacting with a quantum system must exist in an indefinite state.
Von Neumann extended the Copenhagen interpretation by requiring the measurement process to
take place in a mind. He was reluctantly driven to this conclusion by his relentless logic: the only
process in the von Neumann chain that is not merely the motion of molecules is the consciousness of
the observer. His arguments were developed more completely by his illustrious followers, most
notably Fritz London, Edmond Bauer, and Eugene Wigner. Wigner, who went on to win the Nobel
Prize in physics, wrote, “When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass
microscopic phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of consciousness
came to the fore again; it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a fully
consistent way without reference to the consciousness.”6
The box-pair experiment also bears on the role of consciousness and free will. After all, you can
choose to look in one of the boxes or to do an interference experiment, and you will get different
“realities,” one being particle-like, the other wavelike. But your choice of which experiment to do is
not determined, even statistically, by anything in the physical theory. Nothing in quantum mechanics
says you must choose one experiment rather than the other. If you deny that consciousness collapses
the wave function, then this means atoms prior to observation existed as either particle or wave.
Somehow you chose to only look in those boxes that contained particle atoms and you chose to only
do an interference experiment with wave-form atoms. This would also deny free will, because then
your illusion of choice is determined by a conspiracy of the physical universe with the state of your
brain and your perceived choice. This replaces the deterministic universe with one that is
deterministic and conspiratorial.
This is how von Neumann, Wigner, and others brought mind back into nature and made a strong
case against the causal closure of the physical. As we will see, the case gets even stronger.
At this point, it should be stressed that this is only one interpretation of the facts of quantum
mechanics: in addition to the Copenhagen interpretation, there are several other speculations about
what is really happening when quantum possibilities settle down into one actuality. Most attempt to
rescue the determinism and observer independence of classical physics.
For instance, the hidden variable theory holds that the indeterminacy of quantum physics is an
illusion due to our ignorance: if we knew more about the system in question—that is, if we knew the
value of some “hidden variables”—then the indeterminacy would vanish. However, there are several
reasons why the general community of quantum physicists never held the hidden-variable theory in
high regard.
One reason, according to quantum physicist Euan Squires, is that the hidden variable theory is
“extremely complicated and messy. We know the answers from quantum theory and then we construct
a hidden-variable, deterministic theory specifically to give these answers. The resulting theory
appears contrived and unnatural.” Squires points out that the hidden variable theory never gained
widespread acceptance because “the elegance, simplicity and economy of quantum theory contrasted
sharply with the contrived nature of a hidden-variable theory which gave no new predictions in return
for its increased complexity; the whole hidden-variable enterprise was easily dismissed as arising
from a desire, in the minds of those too conservative to accept change, to return to the determinism of
classical physics.”7 Another reason the general community of quantum physicists consider the hidden
variable theory highly implausible is that it explains away indeterminacy by postulating the existence
of an ad hoc quantum force that, unlike any of the other four forces in nature, behaves in a manner
completely unaffected by distance.
The many worlds hypothesis is perhaps the strangest of all. It is the only one that denies the
existence of nonlocality, but it does so by postulating that all possible values of a measured property
exist simultaneously in coexisting universes. When a measurement is made, we are told, the universe
we are in splits into multiple universes, with one of the possible results in each of them. For instance,
if a measurement may yield two possible results, then at the instant of measurement the entire
universe splits in two, with each possible result realized in each universe. If a measurement may yield
a continuum of possible states—such as the position of an electron—then the instant such a
measurement occurs, it is proposed that the universe splits into an infinite number of universes! Since
it is further assumed that these parallel universes cannot interact with each other, this hypothesis is
completely untestable. Entities are being multiplied with incredible profusion. William of Occam
must be spinning in his grave.
In the opinion of many physicists, the last two interpretations are simply desperate, last-ditch
attempts to rescue the classical assumptions of determinism and observer independence that have been
abandoned by quantum mechanics. For instance, one interpretation salvages determinism from
classical physics by postulating hidden variables and the other by speculating that everything that can
happen does in fact happen in an infinite number of constantly splitting parallel universes, regardless
of the way things may appear to any particular version of our constantly splitting selves.
At any rate, these four interpretations are all consistent with the observed facts. They are attempts
to describe what reality is really like between observations, to account for the seemingly bizarre
behavior of matter predicted so accurately by the theory of quantum physics. They are not usually
considered to be scientific theories about the nature of reality, but rather metaphysical theories, as
within quantum mechanics there does not currently seem to be any obvious experiment that one could
perform in order to choose between them.*19
Physicist J. C. Polkinghorne sums up the metaphysical confusion many quantum theorists feel when
he writes:
It is a curious tale. All over the world measurements are continually being made on quantum
mechanical systems. The theory triumphantly predicts, within its probabilistic limits, what their
outcomes will be. It is all a great success. Yet we do not understand what is going on. Does the
fixity on a particular occasion set in as a purely mental act of knowledge? At a transition from
small to large physical systems? At the interface of matter and mind that we call consciousness?
In one of the many subsequent worlds into which the universe has divided itself?9 *20
Perhaps one interpretation is simpler or more logically consistent, or perhaps one of the
interpretations is more aesthetically pleasing than the others. These considerations may provide
philosophical reasons for preferring one over the others, but such reasons can hardly be considered
decisive. However, a fascinating set of experiments performed by physicist Helmut Schmidt and
others appears to show that conscious intent can affect the behavior of otherwise purely random
quantum phenomena. Could an experiment be designed to test the von Neumann interpretation?
Consciousness is central to the von Neumann interpretation of quantum mechanics. According to
this interpretation, some properties of quantum phenomena do not exist in any definite state except
through the intervention of a conscious mind, at which point the wave function of possibilities
collapses into a single state. The usual form of this interpretation allows the observer to collapse the
wave function to a unique outcome but not to have any effect on what outcome actually occurs: the
actual outcome is assumed to be randomly chosen by nature from the range of values provided by the
wave function. But the experiments of German physicist Helmut Schmidt and other physicists indicate
that the consciousness of the observer may not only collapse the wave function to a single outcome
but may also help specify what outcome occurs by shifting the odds in a desired direction.

Chris carter

[Ethos_]

So, how can't they not have effects on the observed ?

"how can't they not" ......double negative Don. Your English leaves us a bit confused Sir Don. Was just wondering if English is your native language? Considering your constant use of copy and pasted excerpts from others, it does cause one wonder??

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

The stream of knowledge is heading toward a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look
more like a great thought than like a machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental
intruder into the realm of matter; we ought rather hail it as the governor of the realm of matter.
PHYSICIST JAMES JEANS

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

So, how can't they not have effects on the observed ?

"how can't they not" ......double negative Don. Your English leaves us a bit confused Sir Don. Was just wondering if English is your native language? Considering your constant use of copy and pasted excerpts from others, it does cause one wonder??

Nevermind : i do type  quickly , so, "how can they not" haha
Try to read those excerpts , Ethos : they are highly interesting  and fascinating : they can explain many things better than i can do ,since i am no expert of QM, not even remotely close thus , not at the present moment at least .... .
Enjoy

[cheryl j]

The mental is just the other side of reality ,your other side as well,

The other side of reality......................Just what exactly is that supposed to mean?

"The other side of the same coin" is a vague analogy that allows one to say simultaneously that A is the same as B, and A is different from B. 

It's vague enough, that one can just as easily apply it to the material position is that "the mental" is just other side of the same coin of physical brain processes described in different vocabulary, or how these  processes are experienced subjectively on the macro level (like Searle's view) I'm surprised that Don likes that "different sides of the same coin" analogy, because it dualism doesn't  seem to accept that the mental and the physical might be different ways of looking at or describing the very same phenomena.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

The mental is just the other side of reality ,your other side as well,

The other side of reality......................Just what exactly is that supposed to mean?

"The other side of the same coin" is a vague analogy that allows one to say simultaneously that A is the same as B, and A is different from B. 

It's vague enough, that one can just as easily apply it to the material position is that "the mental" is just other side of the same coin of physical brain processes described in different vocabulary, or how these  processes are experienced subjectively on the macro level (like Searle's view) I'm surprised that Don likes that "different sides of the same coin" analogy, because it dualism doesn't  seem to accept that the mental and the physical might be different ways of looking at or describing the very same phenomena.

The mental is just the other side of reality ,your other side as well,

The other side of reality......................Just what exactly is that supposed to mean?

Reality , including you and i , is both material physical and non-material non-physical mental at the same time .
You're not just your physical material biological brain and body , but also a consciousness that's irreducible to the physical or to the material : your own consciousness is more fundamental than your physical brain or body can ever be : see that quote of that physicist here above on the subject .

In short :

We are made of 2 totally different substances : matter and the mental ,the latter that's irreducible to the physical or to the material = dualism .

[Ethos_]

I'm surprised that Don likes that "different sides of the same coin" analogy, because it dualism doesn't  seem to accept that the mental and the physical might be different ways of looking at or describing the very same phenomena.

Quite right Cheryl.......I was shocked he would accept the physical side as equally important.

One thought about reality.

I know that there are those that insist that reality is relative to the individual's interpretation. I believe however in an absolute reality, one that transcends all opinions and or personal illusions. This is the reason I continue to defend the scientific method.

For us to define reality, we must define the word real. And that can't be done with vain speculation and countless what if's. I personally think the word if allows way to much room for mysticism, I want to know why things we observe exist and how to explain them. So far, Don has been suggesting largely what if's and very few why's and absolutely no explanations for how.

[cheryl j]

Here's some reading for you, Don.

 "Is Consciousness Universal?

Panpsychism, the ancient doctrine that consciousness is universal, offers some lessons in how to think about subjective experience today"
By Christof Koch

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-consciousness-universal&page=3

Although, I should warn you, he is not using panpsychism in the groovy, Deepak Chopra sense of the word. Here are some passages from the link above.

“Panpsychism is the belief that everything is “enminded.” All of it. Whether it is a brain, a tree, a rock or an electron. Everything that is physical also possesses an interior mental aspect. One is objective—accessible to everybody—and the other phenomenal—accessible only to the subject. That is the sense of the quotation by British-born Buddhist scholar Alan Watts with which I began this essay.
I will defend a narrowed, more nuanced view: namely that any complex system, as defined below, has the basic attributes of mind and has a minimal amount of consciousness in the sense that it feels like something to be that system. If the system falls apart, consciousness ceases to be; it doesn't feel like anything to be a broken system. And the more complex the system, the larger the repertoire of conscious states it can experience.”

His theory of consciousness has to do with integrated information.


"These ideas can be precisely expressed in the language of mathematics using notions from information theory such as entropy. Given a particular brain, with its neurons in a particular state—these neurons are firing while those ones are quiet—one can precisely compute the extent to which this network is integrated. From this calculation, the theory derives a single number, &PHgr; (pronounced “fi”) [see “A Theory of Consciousness,” Consciousness Redux; Scientific American Mind, July/August 2009]. Measured in bits, &PHgr; denotes the size of the conscious repertoire associated with the network of causally interacting parts being in one particular state. Think of &PHgr; as the synergy of the system. The more integrated the system is, the more synergy it has and the more conscious it is. If individual brain regions are too isolated from one another or are interconnected at random, &PHgr; will be low. If the organism has many neurons and is richly endowed with synaptic connections, &PHgr; will be high. Basically, &PHgr; captures the quantity of consciousness. The quality of any one experience—the way in which red feels different from blue and a color is perceived differently from a tone—is conveyed by the informational geometry associated with &PHgr;. The theory assigns to any one brain state a shape, a crystal, in a fantastically high-dimensional qualia space. This crystal is the system viewed from within. It is the voice in the head, the light inside the skull. It is everything you will ever know of the world. It is your only reality. It is the quiddity of experience. The dream of the lotus eater, the mindfulness of the meditating monk and the agony of the cancer patient all feel the way they do because of the shape of the distinct crystals in a space of a trillion dimensions—truly a beatific vision. The water of integrated information is turned into the wine of experience.

Integrated information makes very specific predictions about which brain circuits are involved in consciousness and which ones are peripheral players (even though they might contain many more neurons, their anatomical wiring differs). The theory has most recently been used to build a consciousness meter to assess, in a quantitative manner, the extent to which anesthetized subjects or severely brain-injured patients, such as Terri Schiavo, who died in Florida in 2005, are truly not conscious or do have some conscious experiences but are unable to signal their pain and discomfort to their loved ones [see “A Consciousness Meter,” Consciousness Redux; Scientific American Mind, March/April 2013].

IIT addresses the problem of aggregates by postulating that only “local maxima” of integrated information exist (over elements and spatial and temporal scales): my consciousness, your consciousness, but nothing in between. That is, every person living in the U.S. is, self by self, conscious, but there is no superordinate consciousness of the U.S. population as a whole."

Unlike classical panpsychism, not all physical objects have a &PHgr; that is different from zero. Only integrated systems do. A bunch of disconnected neurons in a dish, a heap of sand, a galaxy of stars or a black hole—none of them are integrated. They have no consciousness. They do not have mental properties.

Last, IIT does not discriminate between squishy brains inside skulls and silicon circuits encased in titanium. Provided that the causal relations among the circuit elements, transistors and other logic gates give rise to integrated information, the system will feel like something

To be honest, I see nothing less reasonable in the above than Stapp's proposal. But I suspect it would not appeal to someone looking for a bridge to a mystical realm or hoping to incorporate their religious views into science.