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Did the world's leading neuroscientists and philosophers such as Ben Libet , -Lord Adrian, Sir John Eccles, Herbert Jasper, Charles Phillips,Wilder Penfield, Roger Sperry, Frederic Bremer, Ragnar Granit, Anders Lundberg, Robert Doty, and Howard Shevrin, Thomas Nagel, Karl Popper , David Chalmers , John Searle and many others as well , did they not acknowledge the the non-physical nature of consciousness ,for example ?
Ecological conditions like those that favor the evolution of open behavioral programs sometimes also favor the evolution of the beginnings of consciousness, by favoring conscious choices. Or in other words, consciousness originates with the choices that are left open by open behavioral programs.Let us look at various possible stages in the emergence of consciousness.As a possible first stage there may evolve something that acts like a centralized warning, that is, like irritation or discomfort or pain, inducing the organism to stop an inadequate movement and to adopt some alternative behavior in its stead before it is too late, before too much damage has been done. The absence of a warning like pain will lead in many cases to destruction. Thus natural selection will favor those individuals that shrink back when they receive a signal indicating an inadequate movement; which means, anticipating the inherent danger of the movement. I suggest that pain may evolve as such a signal; and perhaps also fear.As a second stage, we may consider that natural selection will favor those organisms that try out, by some method or other, the possible movements that might be adopted before they are executed. In this way, real trial-and-error behavior may be replaced, or preceded, by imagined or vicarious trial-and-error behavior. The imagining may perhaps initially consist of incipient efferent nervous signals, serving as a kind of model, or symbolic representation of the actual behavior, and of its possible results.Richard Dawkins has brilliantly developed some such speculations about the beginnings of mind in considerable detail.18 The main points about them are two. One is that these beginnings of mind or consciousness should be favored by natural selection, simply because they mean the substitution of imagined or symbolic or vicarious behavior for real trials which, if erroneous, may have fatal consequences. The other is that we can here apply the ideas of selection and of downward causation to what is clearly a choice situation: the open program allows for possibilities to be played through tentatively — on a screen, as it were — in order that a selection can be made from among these possibilities. [See R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 62f].As a third stage, we may perhaps consider the evolution of more or less conscious aims, or ends: of purposeful animal actions, such as hunting. Unconscious instinctive action may have been purpose-directed before, but once vicarious or imagined trial-and-error behavior has started, it becomes necessary, in situations of choice, to evaluate the end state of the imagined behavior. This may lead to feelings of avoidance or rejection — to anticipations of pain — or to feelings of eager acceptance of the end state; and the latter feelings may come to characterize a consciousness of aim or end or purpose. In connection with open choices, a feeling may evolve of preference for one possibility rather than another; preference for one kind of food, and thus for one kind of ecological niche, rather than another.
<Popper Quote>...Baseless speculations .<Popper Quote>...lol The conscious aware perception or feeling of pain cannot be reduced to its neuronal correlates ,as biological evolution can never intrinsically account for , let alone, explain conscious awareness in general , simply because the latter is irreducible to the former , and simply because the latter cannot emerge from the former , no way : there is no empirical evidence that even implies or suggests that .<Popper Quote>...Speculative fairy tales . Where is the alleged empirical evidence that allegedly supports that = a big zero .<Popper Quote>...Dawkins' simplistic bullshit is not even worth discussing , his refuted genetic determinism even less , his corresponding neo-Darwinism does not hold much water .<Popper Quote>...Why do you confuse baseless speculations with science then ? <Popper Quote>...I thought that the so-called blind random unguided lottery of evolution through the natural selection was / is purposeless : why are you trying to introduce teleology where it does not belong ?
You need to understand that all your materialistic non-sense is no science = has been supported by a big zero evidence .
author=cheryl j link=topic=52526.msg446567#msg446567 date=1418573514]Quote from: dlorde on 14/12/2014 12:14:05Quote from: cheryl j on 13/12/2014 19:37:03Quote from: DonQuichotte on 12/12/2014 18:08:28"Mind-Time The Temporal Factor -Benjamin Libet" : "General I will say that Don is correct in that Libet is critical of reductionist materialism, as expressed in the excerpt and else where in the book. Libet does not automatically exclude the possibility of the immaterial or even things like souls, life after death, etc.
Quote from: cheryl j on 13/12/2014 19:37:03Quote from: DonQuichotte on 12/12/2014 18:08:28"Mind-Time The Temporal Factor -Benjamin Libet" : "General I will say that Don is correct in that Libet is critical of reductionist materialism, as expressed in the excerpt and else where in the book. Libet does not automatically exclude the possibility of the immaterial or even things like souls, life after death, etc.
Quote from: DonQuichotte on 12/12/2014 18:08:28"Mind-Time The Temporal Factor -Benjamin Libet" : "General I will say that Don is correct in that Libet is critical of reductionist materialism, as expressed in the excerpt and else where in the book. Libet does not automatically exclude the possibility of the immaterial or even things like souls, life after death, etc.
"Mind-Time The Temporal Factor -Benjamin Libet" : "General
author=dlorde link=topic=52526.msg446822#msg446822 date=1418992825]Quote from: DonQuichotte on 18/12/2014 20:49:52Did the world's leading neuroscientists and philosophers such as Ben Libet , -Lord Adrian, Sir John Eccles, Herbert Jasper, Charles Phillips,Wilder Penfield, Roger Sperry, Frederic Bremer, Ragnar Granit, Anders Lundberg, Robert Doty, and Howard Shevrin, Thomas Nagel, Karl Popper , David Chalmers , John Searle and many others as well , did they not acknowledge the the non-physical nature of consciousness ,for example ?Well, no, they didn't. Looking at that list, at least three spring to mind, Libet, Searle, and Popper, that explicitly acknowledge that consciousness arises from brain activity (and Chalmers has an open mind).
Libet proposed the 'Conscious Mental Field' (CMF) to explain how the mental arises from the physical brain, saying, "The CMF is not a Cartesian dualistic phenomenon; it is not separable from the brain. Rather, it is proposed to be a localizable system property produced by appropriate neuronal activities, and it cannot exist without them". He called it 'non-physical' because it isn't made of 'stuff', it is patterns of neuronal activity.
Searle said consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain (he called this view 'biological naturalism'). In 'The Problem of Consciousness', he says, "brain processes cause conscious processes".
Popper, in 'Natural Selection and the Emergence of Mind', said consciousness is an evolved behaviour:Ecological conditions like those that favor the evolution of open behavioral programs sometimes also favor the evolution of the beginnings of consciousness, by favoring conscious choices. Or in other words, consciousness originates with the choices that are left open by open behavioral programs.
Let us look at various possible stages in the emergence of consciousness.
As a possible first stage there may evolve something that acts like a centralized warning, that is, like irritation or discomfort or pain, inducing the organism to stop an inadequate movement and to adopt some alternative behavior in its stead before it is too late, before too much damage has been done. The absence of a warning like pain will lead in many cases to destruction. Thus natural selection will favor those individuals that shrink back when they receive a signal indicating an inadequate movement; which means, anticipating the inherent danger of the movement. I suggest that pain may evolve as such a signal; and perhaps also fear.
As a second stage, we may consider that natural selection will favor those organisms that try out, by some method or other, the possible movements that might be adopted before they are executed. In this way, real trial-and-error behavior may be replaced, or preceded, by imagined or vicarious trial-and-error behavior. The imagining may perhaps initially consist of incipient efferent nervous signals, serving as a kind of model, or symbolic representation of the actual behavior, and of its possible results.
Richard Dawkins has brilliantly developed some such speculations about the beginnings of mind in considerable detail.18 The main points about them are two. One is that these beginnings of mind or consciousness should be favored by natural selection, simply because they mean the substitution of imagined or symbolic or vicarious behavior for real trials which, if erroneous, may have fatal consequences. The other is that we can here apply the ideas of selection and of downward causation to what is clearly a choice situation: the open program allows for possibilities to be played through tentatively — on a screen, as it were — in order that a selection can be made from among these possibilities. [See R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 62f].
As a third stage, we may perhaps consider the evolution of more or less conscious aims, or ends: of purposeful animal actions, such as hunting. Unconscious instinctive action may have been purpose-directed before, but once vicarious or imagined trial-and-error behavior has started, it becomes necessary, in situations of choice, to evaluate the end state of the imagined behavior. This may lead to feelings of avoidance or rejection — to anticipations of pain — or to feelings of eager acceptance of the end state; and the latter feelings may come to characterize a consciousness of aim or end or purpose. In connection with open choices, a feeling may evolve of preference for one possibility rather than another; preference for one kind of food, and thus for one kind of ecological niche, rather than another.
You need to understand that the fact that you don't like something doesn't make it false, and continually asserting what you'd like to be true doesn't make it true - neither do false appeals to well-known authorities by misrepresenting their views.
dlorde : You're a lousy reader .Cheryl did understand the above at least :Do not confuse property dualism with substance dualism either .Quote author=cheryl j link=topic=52526.msg446567#msg446567 date=1418573514]I will say that Don is correct in that Libet is critical of reductionist materialism, as expressed in the excerpt and else where in the book. Libet does not automatically exclude the possibility of the immaterial or even things like souls, life after death, etc.
author=cheryl j link=topic=52526.msg446567#msg446567 date=1418573514]I will say that Don is correct in that Libet is critical of reductionist materialism, as expressed in the excerpt and else where in the book. Libet does not automatically exclude the possibility of the immaterial or even things like souls, life after death, etc.
author=cheryl j link=topic=52526.msg446852#msg446852 date=1419022949]Quote from: DonQuichotte on 19/12/2014 19:27:52dlorde : You're a lousy reader .Cheryl did understand the above at least :Do not confuse property dualism with substance dualism either .Quote author=cheryl j link=topic=52526.msg446567#msg446567 date=1418573514]I will say that Don is correct in that Libet is critical of reductionist materialism, as expressed in the excerpt and else where in the book. Libet does not automatically exclude the possibility of the immaterial or even things like souls, life after death, etc. Yes, he did criticize reductionist materialism in his argument for emergent properties. That does not equal a ringing endorsement of any mystical idea you care to propose. That does not mean evidence for non local consciousness that interacts with the brain as a transceiver and exists independently of it.
Despite the fact you've quoted the introduction to his book 3 or 4 times, you seem to have completely misread or ignored the last few paragraphs of that excerpt. That souls, life after death and other religious ideas are tenable as "beliefs" "since there is nothing in all of scientific evidence that directly contradicts such beliefs", but "they do not fall within the purview of scientific knowledge (see Karl Popper’s position, described earlier)."
That is the whole point of the Popper reference to Einstein and the eclipse, that while you may not be able to exclude a belief, for that belief to be a scientific theory, it must be testable, and be confirmed empirically. Which is what every other scientist says as well!
How can you ignore that statement?
And how can you ignore the other ones like:"There is no objective evidence for the existence of conscious phenomena apart from the brain."
"On this last point, we must recognize that there is no evidence to support the concept of separate entity status, which can only be a metaphysical belief."
Who said otherwise then ? Did i say that Libet endorsed those beliefs or your distortions of what they mean ?...Who said that consciousness can exist independently of its brain ,in this life at least , under normal circumstances ,that is ? Did i say otherwise ?
What separate entity ? The one in your imagination, i guess : Once again : consciousness and its brain are inseparable in this life at least .Who said otherwise ? ,although near death experiences have shown that consciousness can exist without its brain after the clinical "near death " of the brain .Strange Kafkaian accusations again.Amazing .
...Libet 's theory says that consciousness as a non-physical process does arise from brain activity indeed .... not the same as assuming that brain activity produces consciousness...
The point is : all those mentioned neuroscientists and philosophers did acknowledge the non-physical nature of consciousness (that's a good start in the right direction ) , in the non-substance dualistic sense indeed , even though they assumed that consciousness can arise from the brain as an alleged emergent phenomena .
dlorde , alancalverd : What particular word , concept , sentence or whatever exactly can't you understand from the following ? :
Quote from: DonQuichotte on 19/12/2014 21:56:00Who said otherwise then ? Did i say that Libet endorsed those beliefs or your distortions of what they mean ?...Who said that consciousness can exist independently of its brain ,in this life at least , under normal circumstances ,that is ? Did i say otherwise ? Uh, yeah you have, repeatedly. Back peddling at it's worst. Do I really have to go back and dig up all your quotes??QuoteWhat separate entity ? The one in your imagination, i guess : Once again : consciousness and its brain are inseparable in this life at least .Who said otherwise ? ,although near death experiences have shown that consciousness can exist without its brain after the clinical "near death " of the brain .Strange Kafkaian accusations again.Amazing .hahahaha. That sentence is as Kafkaian as it gets!
thanks for the concise reply dlord and sorry if i was jumping up on horse that has already been ridden to death, i am just trying to catch up with everyone else.I hope it's not too annoying explaining to the newbie but could I ask another?
As I understand it, although I am probably wrong, The consciousness is a kind of intangible substantial entity that our brains have built or evolution built in order to guide the mind and body through life. then there is the sub-conscious, a secondary but in no way lesser form of automated guiding tool, that our brains and bodies use to navigate life. Then we have the mind and that is yet another tool but one that is used by the brain more as a data bank of sorts and also the reference for human emotive responses, learned behaviors and so on. then there is the housing for these tools, the hardware, the brain, where various chemical and electrical functions (much like a computer) allow us to assemble reality by using these functions in conjunction with the aforementioned tools to create the marvelous machine that is us (humanity).
As mr. quichotte pointed out, how do we explain instances where people have outer body experiences?I have heard a bit on the subject and there are all sorts of ideas about it but has there ever been a definite answer? []
... how can anyone say for certain that this is not some kind of telekinetic response to death?Or as Don says a force not yet found?
... What's more, very diverse or widely genetically separated groups, (like humans and crows in the example above) may share some attributes or abilities, but not others. There is convergent evolution with physical traits. But what I find interesting about convergent evolution of specific traits associated with consciousness is that it demonstrates that our view of consciousness as this unified, either/or, all or nothing "thing" is likely wrong. Consciousness is not some additional, special stuff that was somehow tacked on to a system so it could experience itself- it is the system. Consciousness has an evolutionary past and rudimentary forms. Substance dualist philosophers who only look at the human mind and all its grandeur and insist there is no way it can be produced by cellular activity- there is no way you can get this from that - ignore evolution which says, yes you can, and this is how it happened.