[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Don,
you have a faulty view of the scientific method. Science is not naturalistic. i.e. it does not deny  the possibility of the supernatural, or of something beyond the material. It is, instead, methodologically naturalistic. That is to say the scientific method currently assumes that the world is wholly explicable in natural terms, that if anything else does exist it is beyond the reach of science to study. But is does not deny this possibility. It simply notes that the scientific method would not lend itself to the study of the supernatural.

Thus far science has been remarkably successful with this approach. Do you deny this success?

I think his gripe isn't with the scientific method itself. It's more with the modern-day scientific community (which he says are a bunch of materialists).

[/quote]

It's more ,as follows , once again :

The false materialist naturalist reductionist neo-Darwinian conception of nature ,has been taken for granted as the "scientific world view "  for so long now  = the latter is thus also false,logically  .

See the materialist meta-paradigm dominating in all sciences for that matter since the 19th century at least = reality as a whole is just material or physical .

So, all sciences and hence the false 'scientific world view " have been assuming that reality as a whole is just material or physical =  a materialist false conception of nature , a false materialist world view , a false materialist philosophy ...that has been taken for granted as science , as the " scientific world view " , science proper has absolutely nothing to do with whatsoever thus .

The false materialist conception of nature thus goes  beyond the scientific method, beyond science , beyond science's realm and beyond science's jurisdiction by pretending to know already the nature of reality as a whole .

But , fact is : reality as a whole is not just material or physical , and hence nothing is ,including matter itself , including life , including evolution that cannot be therefore just ...biological .

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Don,
you have a faulty view of the scientific method. Science is not naturalistic. i.e. it does not deny  the possibility of the supernatural, or of something beyond the material. It is, instead, methodologically naturalistic. That is to say the scientific method currently assumes that the world is wholly explicable in natural terms, that if anything else does exist it is beyond the reach of science to study. But is does not deny this possibility. It simply notes that the scientific method would not lend itself to the study of the supernatural.

Wrong , see above .

Thus far science has been remarkably successful with this approach. Do you deny this success?

Science has been extremely successful only thanks to its effective and unparalleled method ,but the materialist mainstream false "scientific world view " , in the sense that reality as a whole is just material or physical , has just been holding science back ,by imprisonning science within the materialist world view or philosophy ,or within the materialist secular belief prison .........
I am tired really of repeating the same simple facts stuff over and over again , for so long now .................
How can't you, folks, get just that ?
Amazing ...

[Ophiolite]

I am tired really of repeating the same simple facts stuff over and over again , for so long now .................

You have not repeated any facts, because you have no facts to repeat. You are repeating opinions. Can't you get that?

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

I am tired really of repeating the same simple facts stuff over and over again , for so long now .................

You have not repeated any facts, because you have no facts to repeat. You are repeating opinions. Can't you get that?

[/quote]

Ok :  genius :

Just try to answer the following then ,for starters :

Has science proper ever proved the materialist "fact " , or rather the materialist core belief assumption to be "true " that reality as a whole is just material or physical ?, the latter is the materialist mainstream "scientific world view " .

Is reality  as a whole  just material or physical?, as all sciences have been assuming it to be for so long now, thanks to materialism .

Is that a "scientific fact " ?

[Kryptid]

About those self-replicating molecules developed in the lab, do they require an immaterial explanation as to how they replicate?

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

About those self-replicating molecules developed in the lab, do they require an immaterial explanation as to how they replicate?

[/quote]

Does fertilization in vitro do?

[Kryptid]

I don't personally think that fertilization (in a test tube or otherwise) requires an immaterial explanation, no.

So how about you answer my question now?

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

I don't personally think that fertilization (in a test tube or otherwise) requires an immaterial explanation, no.

So how about you answer my question now?

[/quote]

There might be some sort of  underlying  formative causation at work :

See the following on the same subject :

Excerpts from "A New Science " By Rupert Sheldrake , Introduction :

At present ,the orthodox approach to biology is given by the mechanistic theory of life: living
organisms are regarded as physico-chemical machines, and all the phenomena of life are considered to
be explicable in principle in terms of physics and chemistry.1 This mechanistic paradigm2 is by no
means new; it has been predominant for well over a century. The main reason most biologists continue
to adhere to it is that it works: it provides a framework of thought within which questions about the
physico-chemical mechanisms of life processes can be asked and answered.
The fact that this approach has resulted in spectacular successes such as the “cracking of the genetic
code” is a strong argument in its favor. Nevertheless, critics have put forward what seem to be good
reasons for doubting that all the phenomena of life, including human behavior, can ever be explained
entirely mechanistically.3 But even if the mechanistic approach were admitted to be severely limited
not only in practice but in principle, it could not simply be abandoned; at present it is almost the only
approach available to experimental biology, and will undoubtedly continue to be followed until there
is some positive alternative.
Any new theory capable of extending or going beyond the mechanistic theory will have to do more
than assert that life involves qualities or factors at present unrecognized by the physical sciences: it
will have to say what sorts of things these qualities or factors are, how they work, and what
relationship they have to known physical and chemical processes.
The simplest way in which the mechanistic theory could be modified would be to suppose that the
phenomena of life depend on a new type of causal factor, unknown to the physical sciences, which
interacts with physico-chemical processes within living organisms. Several versions of this vitalist
theory were proposed in the early twentieth century,4 but none succeeded in making predictions that
could be tested, or suggested new kinds of experiments. If, to quote Sir Karl Popper, “the criterion of
the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability,” 5 vitalism failed to
qualify.
However, the organismic or holistic philosophy of nature provides a context for a more radical
revision of the mechanistic theory. This philosophy denies that everything in the universe can be
explained from the bottom up, as it were, in terms of the properties of subatomic particles, or atoms,
or even molecules. Rather, it recognizes the existence of hierarchically organized systems that, at each
level of complexity, possess properties that cannot be fully understood in terms of the properties
exhibited by their parts in isolation from each other; at each level the whole is more than the sum of
its parts. These wholes can be thought of as organisms, using this term in a deliberately wide sense to
include not only animals and plants, organs, tissues, and cells, but also crystals, molecules, atoms, and
subatomic particles. In effect this philosophy proposes a change from the paradigm of the machine to
the paradigm of the organism in the biological a n d in the physical sciences. In Alfred North
Whitehead’s well-known phrase: “Biology is the study of the larger organisms, whereas physics is the
study of the smaller organisms.”6
Various versions of this organismic philosophy have been advocated by many writers, including
biologists, since the 1920s.7 But if organicism is to have more than a superficial influence on the
natural sciences, it must be able to give rise to testable predictions.8
The most important organismic concept put forward so far is that of morphogenetic fields.9 These
fields are supposed to help account for, or describe, the coming-into-being of the characteristic forms
of embryos and other developing systems. The trouble is that this concept has been used ambiguously.
The term itself seems to imply the existence of a new type of physical field that plays a role in the
development of form. But some organismic theoreticians deny that they are suggesting the existence
of any new type of field, entity, or factor at present unrecognized by physics;10 rather, they are
providing a new way of talking about complex physico-chemical systems.11 This approach seems
unlikely to lead very far. The concept of morphogenetic fields can be of practical scientific value only
if it leads to testable predictions that differ from those of the conventional mechanistic theory. And
such predictions cannot be made unless morphogenetic fields are considered to have measurable
effects.
The hypothesis put forward in this book is based on the idea that morphogenetic fields do indeed
have measurable physical effects. It proposes that specific morphogenetic fields are responsible for
the characteristic form and organization of systems at all levels of complexity, not only in the realm
of biology, but also in the realms of chemistry and physics. These fields order the systems with which
they are associated by affecting events that, from an energetic point of view, appear to be
indeterminate or probabilistic; they impose patterned restrictions on the energetically possible
outcomes of physical processes.
If morphogenetic fields are responsible for the organization and form of material systems, they
must themselves have characteristic structures. So where do these field structures come from? They
are derived from the morphogenetic fields associated with previous similar systems: the
morphogenetic fields of all past systems become present to any subsequent similar system; the
structures of past systems affect subsequent similar systems by a cumulative influence that acts across
both space and time.
According to this hypothesis, systems are organized in the way they are because similar systems
were organized that way in the past. For example, the molecules of a complex organic chemical
crystallize in a characteristic pattern because the same substance crystallized that way before; a plant
takes up the form characteristic of its species because past members of the species took up that form;
and an animal acts instinctively in a particular manner because similar animals behaved like that
previously.
The hypothesis is concerned with the repetition of forms and patterns of organization; the question
of the origin of these forms and patterns lies outside its scope. This question can be answered in
several different ways, but all of them seem to be equally compatible with the suggested means of
repetition.12
A number of testable predictions, which differ strikingly from those of the conventional
mechanistic theory, can be deduced from this hypothesis. A single example will suffice: If an animal,
say a rat, learns to carry out a new pattern of behavior, there will be a tendency for any subsequent
similar rat (of the same breed, reared under similar conditions, etc.) to learn more quickly to carry out
the same pattern of behavior. The larger the number of rats that learn to perform the task, the easier it
should be for any subsequent similar rat to learn it. Thus, for instance, if thousands of rats were
trained to perform a new task in a laboratory in London, similar rats should learn to carry out the same
task more quickly in laboratories everywhere else. If the speed of learning of rats in another
laboratory, say in New York, were to be measured before and after the rats in London were trained, the
rats tested on the second occasion should learn more quickly than those tested on the first. The effect
should take place in the absence of any known type of physical connection or communication between
the two laboratories.
Such a prediction may seem so improbable as to be absurd. Yet, remarkably enough, there is
already evidence from laboratory studies of rats that the predicted effect actually occurs.13
This hypothesis, called the hypothesis of formative causation, leads to an interpretation of many
physical and biological phenomena that is radically different from that of existing theories, and
enables a number of well-known problems to be seen in a new light. In this book, it is sketched out in
a preliminary form, some of its implications are discussed, and various ways in which it could be
tested are suggested.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

THE UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF BIOLOGY
1.1 The background of success
In the world of science, the predominant theory of life is mechanistic. Living organisms are machines.
They have no souls or mysterious vital principles; they can be fully explained in terms of physics and
chemistry. This is not a new idea: it dates back to the philosopher René Descartes (1596–1650). In
1867, T. H. Huxley summed it up as follows:
Zoological physiology is the doctrine of the functions or actions of animals. It regards animal
bodies as machines impelled by various forces and performing a certain amount of work that can
be expressed in terms of the ordinary forces of nature. The final object of physiology is to deduce
the facts of morphology on the one hand, and those of ecology on the other, from the laws of the
molecular forces of matter.1
The subsequent developments of physiology, biochemistry, biophysics, genetics, and molecular
biology are all foreshadowed in these ideas. In many respects these sciences have been brilliantly
successful, none more so than molecular biology. The discovery of the structure of DNA, the
“cracking of the genetic code,” the elucidation of the mechanism of protein synthesis, and the
sequencing of the human genome seem impressive confirmations of the validity of this approach. The
most articulate advocates of the mechanistic theory are molecular biologists. Their accounts usually
begin with a brief dismissal of the vitalist and organismic theories. These are defined as survivals of
“primitive” beliefs that are bound to retreat further and further as mechanistic biology advances. They
then proceed along the following lines:2
The chemical nature of the genetic material, DNA, is now known and so is the genetic code by
which it codes for the sequence of amino acids in proteins. The mechanism of protein synthesis is
understood in considerable detail. The structure of many proteins has now been worked out. All
enzymes are proteins, and enzymes catalyze the complex chains and cycles of biochemical
reactions that constitute the metabolism of an organism. Metabolism is controlled by
biochemical feedback; several mechanisms are known by which the rates of enzymic activity can
be regulated. Proteins and nucleic acids aggregate spontaneously to form structures such as
viruses and ribosomes. Given the range of properties of proteins, plus the properties of other
physicochemical systems such as lipid membranes, plus complex systems of physicochemical
interaction, the properties of living cells can, in principle, be fully explained.
The key to the problems of differentiation and development, about which very little is known,
is the understanding of the control of protein synthesis. The way in which the synthesis of certain
metabolic enzymes and other proteins is controlled is understood in detail in the bacterium
Escherichia coli. The control of protein synthesis takes place by more complicated mechanisms
in higher organisms, but we now know more about them than ever before. In due course,
differentiation and development should be explicable in terms of series of chemically operated
“switches,” which “switch on” or “switch off ” genes or groups of genes. Major systems of
switches are already known, such as the homeobox genes.3
The way in which the parts of living organisms are adapted to the functions of the whole, and
the apparent purposiveness of the structure and behavior of living organisms, depends on random
genetic mutations followed by natural selection: those genes that increase the ability of an
organism to survive and reproduce will be selected for; harmful mutations will be eliminated.
Thus the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution can account for purposiveness; it is totally
unnecessary to suppose that any mysterious “vital factors” are involved.
More and more is known about the functioning of the central nervous system, and the advances
of biochemistry, biophysics, electrophysiology and brain scanning are already helping us to
explain what we speak of as the mind in terms of physical and chemical mechanisms in the brain.
Computer modelling enables us to see the mind as software operating through the hardware of the
brain. Dreams of creating artificial intelligence, and even consciousness itself, within machines
may soon come closer to reality.4
Thus living organisms are, in principle, fully explicable in terms of physics and chemistry. Our
limited understanding of the mechanisms of development and of the central nervous system is
due to the enormous complexity of the problems; but now, armed with the powerful new concepts
of molecular biology and with the aid of computer models, these subjects can be tackled in a way
not previously possible.
In the light of past successes, optimism that all the problems of biology can ultimately be solved
mechanistically is understandable. But a realistic opinion about the prospects for mechanistic
explanation must depend on more than an act of faith; it can be formed only after a consideration of
the outstanding problems of biology, and how they might be solved.
1.2 The problems of morphogenesis
Biological morphogenesis can be defined as the “coming-into-being of characteristic and specific
form in living organisms.”5 The first problem is precisely that form comes into being: new structures
appear, such as eyes and flowers, which cannot be explained in terms of structures already present in
the egg. There are no miniature eyes in an eagle’s eggs, or miniature flowers in foxglove seeds.
The second problem is that many developing systems can regulate; in other words, if a part of a
developing system is removed (or if an additional part is added), the system continues to develop in
such a way that a more or less normal structure is produced. The classical demonstration of this
phenomenon was in Hans Driesch’s experiments on sea-urchin embryos. When one of the cells of a
very young embryo at the two-celled stage was killed, the remaining cell gave rise not to half a sea
urchin but to a small but complete sea urchin. Similarly, small but complete organisms developed
after the destruction of any one, two, or three cells of embryos at the four-celled stage. Conversely, the
fusion of two young sea-urchin embryos resulted in the development of one giant sea urchin.6
Regulation occurs in all developing organisms, in animals and plants. In animals, as development
proceeds, this capacity is often lost as the fate of different regions of the embryo becomes determined,
as in limbs and livers. But even when determination occurs at an early stage, as in insect embryos,
regulation still occurs after damage to the egg (see figure 1).
Results of this type show that developing plants and animals proceed toward a morphological goal.
They have some property that specifies this goal and enables them to reach it, even if parts of the
system are removed and the normal course of development is disturbed.
The third problem is regeneration. Organisms replace or restore damaged structures. Many plants
have almost unlimited regenerative abilities. If the trunk, branches, and twigs of a willow tree are cut
up into hundreds of pieces, all can grow into new trees. Some animals also regenerate from parts. A
flatworm, for example, can be cut up into several pieces that all grow into new worms.
Figure 1. An example of regulation. On the left is a normal embryo of the dragonfly Platycnemis pennipes. On the right is a small
but complete embryo formed from the posterior half of an egg ligated around the middle soon after laying. (After Weiss, 1939)
Some vertebrates show striking powers of regeneration. If the lens is surgically removed from a
newt’s eye, a new lens regenerates from the edge of the iris (figure 2); in normal embryonic
development, the lens is formed in a very different way, from the skin. The German biologist Gustav
Wolff studied this type of regeneration in the 1890s. He deliberately chose a kind of mutilation that
would not have occurred accidentally in nature; there would therefore have been no natural selection
for this regenerative process.7
Figure 2. Regeneration of a lens from the margin of the iris in a newt’s eye after the surgical removal of the original lens. (Cf.
Needham, 1942)
The fourth problem is posed by the simple fact of reproduction: a detached part of the parent
becomes a new organism; a part becomes a whole.
The only way in which these phenomena can be understood is in terms of causes that are somehow
more than the sum of the parts, and which determine the goals of the processes of development.
Vitalists ascribe these properties to vital factors, organicists to systems properties or morphogenetic
fields, and mechanists to genetic programs.
The concept of genetic programs is based on an analogy with computer programs. The metaphor
implies that the fertilized egg contains a preformed program that somehow coordinates the organism’s
development. But the genetic program must involve something more than the chemical structure of
DNA, because identical copies of DNA are passed on to all cells; if all cells were programmed
identically, they could not develop differently. So what exactly is it? In response to this question, the
idea can only disintegrate into vague suggestions about physico-chemical interactions structured in
time and space; the problem is merely restated.8
There is a further problem with the program metaphor. A computer program is put into a computer
by an intelligent conscious being, the computer programmer. It is intelligently designed in order to
achieve a computational goal. Insofar as the genetic program is analogous to computer software, it
implies the existence of a purposive mind that plays the role of the programmer.
Mechanists reject the idea that developing organisms are under the control of a vital factor that
guides them to their morphological goals. But insofar as mechanistic explanations depend on
teleological concepts such as genetic programs or genetic instructions, goal-directedness can be
explained only because it has already been smuggled in. Indeed the properties attributed to genetic
programs are remarkably similar to those with which vitalists endowed their hypothetical vital
factors; ironically, the genetic program seems to be very like a vital factor in a mechanistic guise.9
In Richard Dawkins’s concept of the “selfish gene,” the genes themselves have come to life. They
are like little people: they are as ruthless and competitive as “successful Chicago gangsters”; they
have powers to “mold matter,” to “create form,” to “choose,” and even “aspire to immortality.”10
Dawkins’s rhetoric is vitalistic. His selfish genes are miniaturized vital factors.
Nevertheless, the fact that biological morphogenesis cannot be explained in a rigorously
mechanistic manner at present does not prove that it never will be. The prospects for arriving at such
an explanation in the future are considered in the next chapter.
1.3 Behavior
If the problems of morphogenesis are dauntingly difficult, those of behavior are even more so. First,
instinct. Consider, for example, how spiders are able to spin webs without learning from other
spiders.11 Or consider the behavior of European cuckoos. The young are hatched and reared by birds
of other species, and never see their parents. Toward the end of the summer, the adult cuckoos migrate
to their other home in southern Africa. About a month later, the young cuckoos congregate together
and they also migrate to southern Africa, where they join their elders.12 They instinctively migrate
and know when to migrate; they instinctively recognize other young cuckoos and congregate together;
and they instinctively know in which direction they should fly and how to find their ancestral habitats
in southern Africa, after flying unaccompanied over the Straits of Gibraltar and the Sahara Desert.
Second, there is the problem posed by the goal-directedness of animal behavior. Even if an animal
is prevented from reaching its goal in one way, it may get there by another. For example, a dog after
amputation of a leg learns how to walk on three legs rather than four. Another dog after brain damage
gradually recovers most of its previous abilities. A third dog has obstacles put in its path. But all three
dogs can go from one place to another place they want to get to in spite of disturbances to their limbs,
central nervous systems, and environments.
Third, there is the problem of intelligent behavior; new patterns of behavior appear that cannot be
explained entirely in terms of preceding causes. Animals can be creative.
An enormous gulf of ignorance lies between these phenomena and the sciences of molecular
biology, biochemistry, genetics, and neurophysiology.
How can the migratory behavior of young cuckoos ultimately be explained in terms of DNA,
protein synthesis, and molecular cell biology? Obviously a satisfactory explanation would require
more than a demonstration that appropriate genes containing appropriate base-sequences in DNA were
necessary for this behavior, or that the behavior of cuckoos depends on electrical impulses in nerves;
it would require some understanding of the connections between specific sequences of bases in DNA,
the birds’ nervous system, and the migratory behavior. At present, these connections can be provided
only by the same elusive entities that “explain” all the phenomena of morphogenesis: genetic
programs, vital factors, system properties, or morphogenetic fields.
In any case, an understanding of behavior presupposes an understanding of morphogenesis. Even if
all the behavior of a relatively simple animal, say a nematode worm, could be understood in detail in
terms of the “wiring” and physiology of its nervous system, there would still be the problem of how
the nervous system was wired so precisely in the first place.
1.4 Evolution
Long before Mendelian genetics was thought of, plant and animal breeders developed many varieties
of cultivated plants and domesticated animals, like Damascene roses and Pharaoh hounds. Selective
breeding was the basis of their success. Charles Darwin argued persuasively that a comparable
development of races and varieties occurred in the wild under the influence of natural rather than
artificial selection.
Darwin also believed that habits acquired by plants and animals could be inherited.13 The neo-
Darwinian theory of evolution agrees about the importance of natural selection but rejects the
inheritance of habits, and tries instead to explain all evolutionary innovation in terms of random
genetic mutations, which is why it is neo-Darwinian rather than Darwinian.
Everyone agrees that mutation and natural selection can lead to the formation of varieties or
subspecies. But there is no general agreement among evolutionary biologists that gradual
microevolution within a species can account for the origin of species themselves, or genera, families,
and higher taxonomic divisions. One school of thought holds that all large-scale evolution, or
macroevolution, can indeed be explained in terms of long-continued processes of microevolution;14
the other school denies this, and postulates that major jumps occur suddenly in the course of
evolution.15 But while opinions differ as to the relative importance of many small mutations or a few
large ones, there is general agreement that mutations are random, and that evolution can be explained
by a combination of random mutation and natural selection.
This theory is inevitably speculative. The evidence for evolution is open to a variety of
interpretations. Opponents of neo-Darwinism can argue that evolutionary innovations are not entirely
explicable in terms of chance events, but are due to the activity of a creative principle unrecognized
by mechanistic science. Moreover, the selection pressures arising from the behavior and properties of
living organisms may themselves depend on inner organizing factors that are essentially nonmechanistic.
Thus the problem of evolution cannot be solved conclusively. Organismic theories necessarily
involve an extrapolation of organismic ideas, just as the neo-Darwinian theory involves an
extrapolation of mechanistic ideas.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

1.5 The origin of life
This problem of the origin of life is just as insoluble as that of evolution, for the same reasons. What
happened in the distant past can never be known for certain; there will probably always be a plethora
of speculations. Scenarios for life’s origin include its spontaneous appearance in a primeval broth on
Earth; the infection of the Earth by microorganisms deliberately sent on a space ship by intelligent
beings on a planet in another solar system;16 and the evolution of life on comets containing organic
materials derived from interstellar dust.17
Even if the conditions under which life originated were known, this information would shed no light
on the nature of life. Assuming it could be demonstrated, for example, that the first living organisms
arose from nonliving chemical aggregates or “hypercycles” of chemical processes18 in a primeval
broth, this would not prove that they were entirely mechanistic. Organicists would argue that new
organismic properties emerged in the first living system precisely when it came to life. The same
arguments would apply even if living organisms were to be synthesized artificially from chemicals in
a test tube.
1.6 Minds
The mechanistic theory postulates that all the phenomena of life, including human behavior, can in
principle be explained in terms of physics. It is a form of materialism or physicalism, the theory that
only material or physical things exist; they are the only reality. Materialism is opposed to the more
commonsense view that minds affect bodies, and are capable of interacting with them.19
Materialism runs into logical problems from the outset: attempting to explain mental activity in
terms of physical science is circular, because science itself depends on mental activity.20 This
problem became apparent within modern physics in connection with the role of the observer in
processes of physical measurement; the principles of physics “cannot even be formulated without
referring (though in some versions only implicitly) to the impressions—and thus to the minds—of the
observers” (Bernard D’Espagnat).21 Since physics presupposes the minds of observers, these minds
cannot be explained in terms of physics.22
Among materialist philosophers of mind, the most extreme stance is called eliminative
materialism. This philosophy claims that beliefs and feelings have no coherent definition and play no
part in the scientific understanding of the brain. The neuroscience of the future will have no need for
outmoded concepts like beliefs and feelings; they will join previously discarded concepts like
phlogiston and vital forces. Minds will be explained completely in terms of the objectively
measurable activity of the nervous system.23
Another materialist approach to the problem of consciousness is to admit that it exists while
denying it does anything. This view is called epiphenomenalism, the claim that “mental events are
caused by physical events in the brain although mental events themselves do not cause anything.”24
As the philosopher Alex Hyslop has put it, “The case for epiphenomenalism is the case for
materialism, together with the case against materialism. The case for materialism is the argument
from science, from a triumphant, or at least steadily triumphing science. The case against materialism
is that there are features of our conscious experience that are not accounted for by science.”25
In psychology, the science of the mind, there are different schools of thought about the relationship
between mind and body. The most extreme materialist solution is to deny the reality of the mind and
to assume that only the body is real. This was the approach of the Behaviorist school, which
dominated academic psychology for much of the twentieth century. Behaviorists confined their
attention to objectively observable behavior and ignored the existence of consciousness.26 But
behaviorism was not a testable scientific hypothesis; it was a methodology.27 It is now out of fashion
within academic psychology, and has largely been replaced by cognitive psychology.
Like behaviorism, cognitive psychology rejects introspection, but it admits the existence of internal
mental states, such as belief, desires, and motivations. Its dominant metaphor is the computer. Mental
activity is thought of as “information processing.” But the limitations of the computer metaphor are
becoming increasingly apparent, not least through a new recognition of the role of the emotions28 and
an acknowledgment that minds are embodied and actively related to the environment.29
In the 1990s, the philosopher David Chalmers made a distinction between what he called the “easy
problems” of consciousness, like finding neural correlates of sensation—for example, which parts of
the brain become active during the visual perception of moving objects—and the “hard problem.” The
hard problem is, “Why does awareness of sensory information exist at all?” There is a radical
distinction between the biology of the brain and mental experience, which includes the experience of
qualities, such as red. (Philosophers of mind call these subjective experiences “qualia.”) Chalmers
argues that to take consciousness seriously, it is necessary to go beyond a strict materialist
framework.30
Unlike the materialist psychologies that predominate within academic institutions, other schools of
psychology accept subjective experience as their starting point, but also recognize that not all mental
activity is conscious: many aspects of behavior and subjective experience depend on the subconscious
or unconscious mind. The unconscious mind may also have properties that defy mechanistic
explanation. For example, in Carl Jung’s development of this concept, the unconscious is not confined
to individual minds, but provides a common substratum shared by all human minds, the collective
unconscious.
In addition to our immediate consciousness, which is of a thoroughly personal nature and which
we believe to be the only empirical psyche (even if we tack on the personal unconscious as an
appendix) there exists a second psychic system of a collective, universal, and impersonal nature
which is identical in all individuals. This collective unconscious does not develop individually
but is inherited. It consists of pre-existent forms, the archetypes, which can only become
conscious secondarily and which give definite form to certain psychic contents.31
Jung tried to explain the inheritance of the collective unconscious physically by suggesting that the
archetypal forms were “present in the germplasm.”32 But it is doubtful that anything with the
properties of the archetypal forms could be inherited chemically in the structure of DNA, or in any
other physical or chemical structure in sperm or egg cells. Indeed the idea of the collective
unconscious makes little sense in terms of current mechanistic biology, whatever its merits as a
psychological theory might be.
However, there is no a priori reason why psychological theories should be confined within the
framework of the mechanistic theory. Mental phenomena need not necessarily depend on the known
laws of physics, but may depend on principles as yet unrecognized by science.
1.7 Parapsychology
In all traditional societies, stories are told of men and women with seemingly miraculous powers, and
such powers are acknowledged by all religions. In many parts of the world, various psychic abilities
are cultivated within systems such as shamanism, sorcery, tantric yoga, and spiritualism. And even
within modern Western society, there are persistent reports of unexplained phenomena, such as
telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, memories of past lives, hauntings, poltergeists, psychokinesis,
and so on. Surveys show that the most common kind of telepathy occurs in connection with
technology, namely telephone telepathy, whereby people think of someone for no apparent reason who
calls soon afterward.33
Although dogmatic skeptics dismiss all this evidence out of hand,34 the possibility that at least
some of these events actually occur is an open question. It can be answered only after an examination
of the evidence.
The scientific study of allegedly psychic phenomena has now been going on for more than a
century. Investigators in this field of psychic research have discovered some cases of fraud, and found
that some apparently paranormal events can in fact be explained by normal causes. But there remains
a large body of evidence that seems to defy explanation in terms of any known physical principles.35
Numerous experiments designed to test for so-called extrasensory perception have yielded positive
results with odds against chance coincidence of thousands, millions, or even billions to one.36
Insofar as these phenomena cannot be explained in terms of the known laws of physics and
chemistry, from the mechanistic point of view they ought not to occur.37 But if they do, then there are
two possible approaches. The first is to suppose that they depend on nonphysical causal factors or
connecting principles.38 The second is to start from the assumption that they depend on laws of
physics as yet unknown, or on extensions of quantum theory,39 for example by postulating that mental
states play a role in determining the outcomes of probabilistic processes of physical change.40
1.8 Conclusions
This brief consideration of the outstanding problems of biology does not offer much hope that they
can all be solved by an exclusively mechanistic approach. In the case of morphogenesis and animal
behavior, the question is open. The problems of evolution and the origin of life are insoluble per se
and cannot help to decide between the mechanistic and other possible theories of life. The mechanistic
theory runs into serious philosophical difficulties in connection with the problem of the limits of
physical explanation; in relation to psychology, it leads to seemingly insoluble problems; and it is in
conflict with the apparent evidence for parapsychological phenomena.
The prospects for improved versions of mechanistic, vitalist, and organismic theories are discussed
in the following chapter. Morphogenesis is the starting point.

[Kryptid]

Seriously man, there was no need to post such a giant slab of text to answer a simple "yes" or "no" question.

As to "underlying formative causation", can you be more specific? Are the laws of physics not enough to explain the replication of a molecule? If not, then what part of the process requires something more?

[Ophiolite]

Ok :  genius :

Just try to answer the following then ,for starters :

You are the one making the assertions. You are the one who claims you have evidence. You are the one who is required, by the rules of the forum, to produce that evidence.

However, on the off-chance you may actually read something properly here we go:

Has science proper ever proved the materialist "fact " , or rather the materialist core belief assumption to be "true " that reality as a whole is just material or physical ?, the latter is the materialist mainstream "scientific world view " .

I have explained this you before. Science employs methodological naturalism. That is it uses a working presumption that reality is material; that reality conforms to certain rules; that these rules can be explored via the scientific method. It does not deny the possibility of the immaterial, but considers that, if it exists, to be outside its purview.

In short, you are setting up a strawman and arguing against that.

[alancalverd]

If life that's sentient is just a matter of physics and chemistry , then , try to explain consciousness to us scientifically then, .

I repeat my offer, made many  times previously. If you define consciousness, I'll explain  it.

There is little point in waffling on about anything if we haven't agreed what we are talking about.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Seriously man, there was no need to post such a giant slab of text to answer a simple "yes" or "no" question.

The answer to that seemingly easy question of yours,that's not that easy thus ,is contained in those excerpts you should appreciate by being open minded to them , insteaf of just listening to your own dogmatic music on the subject , you have been taking for granted as science .

As to "underlying formative causation", can you be more specific? Are the laws of physics not enough to explain the replication of a molecule? If not, then what part of the process requires something more?

The  so-called  laws of physics are just one single part of the whole pic ( The very notion of laws is in fact just a human projection )  , the other part is the mental or non-physical, the latter that's more fundamental than the physical, and hence there might be some formative or other forms of causation out there underlying the so-called laws of physics themselves : mental or non-physical forms of causation at that ,maybe not in the form of morphic resonance ,as Sheldrake suggests here  above : read what Sheldrake had to say about just that , as displayed here above , just for your lovely sweet blue eyes , lazy guy .

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

If life that's sentient is just a matter of physics and chemistry , then , try to explain consciousness to us scientifically then, .

I repeat my offer, made many  times previously. If you define consciousness, I'll explain  it.

There is little point in waffling on about anything if we haven't agreed what we are talking about.

[/quote]

haha : you can explain consciousness ? haha
Humanity as a whole , during all its history , including science that's just a human activity , have been breaking their teeth and much more in relation to the hard problem of consciousness for so long now up to this present date  ,in vain, while there is still in fact no end in sight to that human struggle and attempts to try to tackle the  extremely hard and almost impossible issue of consciousness , and you , of all people, do pretend to be able to explain consciousness that's non-physical, and hence that's non-definable :

Sweet dreams  in your wonderland  , you silly simple -minded naive zombie Alice .

Who can anyone for that matter ever take you ...seriously ?.

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

Ok :  genius :

Just try to answer the following then ,for starters :

You are the one making the assertions. You are the one who claims you have evidence. You are the one who is required, by the rules of the forum, to produce that evidence.

However, on the off-chance you may actually read something properly here we go:

Has science proper ever proved the materialist "fact " , or rather the materialist core belief assumption to be "true " that reality as a whole is just material or physical ?, the latter is the materialist mainstream "scientific world view " .

I have explained this you before. Science employs methodological naturalism. That is it uses a working presumption that reality is material; that reality conforms to certain rules; that these rules can be explored via the scientific method. It does not deny the possibility of the immaterial, but considers that, if it exists, to be outside its purview.

In short, you are setting up a strawman and arguing against that.

[/quote]

Then, i must disappoint you by saying that you are not well informed ,regarding the above , simply because all sciences for that matter have been assuming for so long now that reality is just material or physical, thanks to materialism thus = that's the current dominating materialist meta-paradigm in science = that's the current   mainstream 'scientific world view " or   the mainstream "scientific consensus " , regarding the nature of reality , and hence there is no such a "thing " or a process such as the non-physical , including the mental that's just a biological process , according to the mainstream false 'scientific world view " .


Try to answer the core question here ,once again,then  :

Has science ever proved the materialist "fact " , or rather the materialist core belief assumption to be "true " that reality is just material or physical ? Obviously ...not, never , ever = the current mainstream "scientific world view " has been just the materialist false conception of nature , and hence has absolutely nothing to do with science proper , or with the true scientific world view .

[alancalverd]

haha : you can explain consciousness ? haha

Yes I can, and I will, if you define it. Try me!

[DonQuichotte (OP)]

haha : you can explain consciousness ? haha

Yes I can, and I will, if you define it. Try me!

[/quote]

Can't you read , 'scientist " ?Amazing .

What's wrong with your capacity of judgement ? I wonder ...

What's wrong with you ?

If life that's sentient is just a matter of physics and chemistry , then , try to explain consciousness to us scientifically then, .

I repeat my offer, made many  times previously. If you define consciousness, I'll explain  it.

There is little point in waffling on about anything if we haven't agreed what we are talking about.

[/quote]

haha : you can explain consciousness ? haha
Humanity as a whole , during all its history , including science that's just a human activity , have been breaking their teeth and much more in relation to the hard problem of consciousness for so long now up to this present date  ,in vain, while there is still in fact no end in sight to that human struggle and attempts to try to tackle the  extremely hard and almost impossible issue of consciousness , and you , of all people, do pretend to be able to explain consciousness that's non-physical, and hence that's non-definable :

Sweet dreams  in your wonderland  , you silly simple -minded naive zombie Alice .

Who can anyone for that matter ever take you ...seriously ?.

[Kryptid]

You didn't directly address my questions. Part of the problem of saying "read what Sheldrake said" is that you admit that you do not adhere to all of his beliefs. Therefore, you must be specific as to which of those beliefs you do adhere to.

So please answer this directly: Which step in the molecular replication process requires an immaterial explanation?

Here is a diagram just in case you need one:

[RD]

Try to explain ... music

music can emerge from cellular automata ... http://www.earslap.com/projectslab/otomata  [requires Adobe flash , press play]